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Erosion of Official Immunity of
Personnel Supervisors in the
Public Sector
By C. AIN BLITZ*

Introduction

The last five years have witnessed substantial erosion of the
absolute immunity traditionally enjoyed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. Even members of Congress, who enjoy absolute constitutional immunity under the
speech or debate clause,1 have seen the gradual diminution of that
basic constitutional privilege in recent years.2
On June 29, 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided
Butz v. Economous a case involving the scope of immunity and
personal liability of federal employees who commit torts which violate the constitutional rights of others. The case will have farreaching implications. Public sector employees have traditionally
enjoyed the protections of absolute immunity for conduct falling
within the scope of their official duties, particularly conduct involving- the exercise of administrative discretion. 4 Economou sub* B.A., 1972, Willamette University;, J.D., 1975, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis &
Clark College; LL.M. (Labor Law), 1979, Georgetown University. Currently attorney-at-law,
Young, Horn, Cass & Scott, Eugene, Oregon.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, which states in pertinent part: "The Senators and
Representatives ... shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place." See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
2. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). Cf. United States v. Helstoski, 442
U.S. 477 (1979).
3. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
4. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Administrative discretion necessarily includes adverse personnel actions of agency heads and their designees including operating
[671]
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stantially erodes this protection. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that federal officials who discharge their duties
in ways which knowingly violate the Constitution, or who act in a
manner that transgresses a clearly established constitutional right,
are entitled to only qualified immunity in a civil suit for damages
arising from the unconstitutional action. 5 The Court, however, did
officials and supervisors. Section 01.3, Exec. Order No. 9,830, 12 Fed. Reg. 1259 (1947)
provides:
Agency responsibilities for personnel management.
(a) The head of each agency, in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive orders, and rules, shall be responsible for personnel management in his
agency. To assist and advise him in carrying out this responsibility he shall maintain or establish such office or division of personnel as may be required. He shall
designate a director of personnel or other similarly responsible official to be in
charge of such office or division. Such director or other official shall represent the
head of the agency in personnel matters, subject to his instructions.
(b) The head of each agency shall provide for the cooperation of his agency
with the Civil Service Commission in the conduct of personnel matters.
(c) Authority for the conduct of personnel matters within each agency should
be delegated to the extent compatible with provisions of law and with economical
and efficient administration to those officials responsible for planning, directing,
and supervising the work of others. The exercise of such delegated authority shall
be subject to policies, rules, regulations and standards established by the head of
the agency, and shall be subject to appropriate review and inspection.
(d) The head of each agency shall remove, demote, or reassign to another
position any employee in the competitive service whose conduct or capacity is
such that his removal, demotion, or reassignment will promote the efficiency of
the service.
Section 1-1 of the Federal Personnel Manual, Dec. 21, 1976, provides:
a. General. Section 01.3(d) of Executive Order 9830 places a positive responsibility on the head of each agency "to remove, demote, or reassign to another position any employee in the competitive service whose conduct or capacity is such
that his removal, demotion, or reassignment will promote the efficiency of the service." Thus, the agency is both empowered and obligated to act when it determines that action is in order.
b. Delegation of authority. Although the basic authority and responsibility to
take action in the circumstances described in paragraph a above are placed by law
and Executive order in the head of the agency, they are generally delegated down
the line to specific operating officials and supervisors.
c. Compliance with job protection procedures. Strict adherence to any applicable job protection procedures, whether required by the Civil Service regulations
or by the agency's regulations, is an essential phase of the agency's responsibility.
In addition, any adverse action taken must be based on good cause, be consistent
with other such actions taken by the agency, and be fair and equitable.
5. 438 U.S. at 507 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974)) which provides the applicable standard of qualified immunity established for federal officers in Economou: "[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time
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not do away with absolute immunity altogether. It recognized certain "exceptional situations" in which absolute immunity from suit
would be available to federal officers.6 It did so because it felt that
immunity is "essential for the conduct of public business"
in certain circumstances. Accordingly, the Court identified officials
whose special functions required a full exemption from liability as
including judges, 8 federal prosecutors, 9 jurors and witnesses, 10 and
their administrative agency counterparts."" Administrative law
judges and agency attorneys who perform functions analogous to
those of a prosecutor were also included.1 2 Nevertheless, although
absolute immunity for federal officials was not eliminated, as a result of Economou, it was weakened significantly.
Traditional immunity doctrines were not addressed in Economou; only the recently evolved concept of "constitutional tort" was
considered by the Court.13 Traditional theories therefore, continue
to apply in purely common-law tort actions where a constitutional
tort cannot be implied." The significance of this concept is that
many common-law torts have constitutional law analogs which
provide greater opportunity for vindicating constitutional rights
than is permitted by the limited rule of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents.'5 The Court, no doubt mindful of the increase in
litigation this might cause, suggested that federal courts be "alert
to the possibilities of artful pleading" and that they dismiss complaints which fail to state a "compensable claim for relief under
of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with
good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts
performed in the course of official conduct." 438 U.S. at 497-98.
6. 438 U.S at 507.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 508-09 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872)).
9. Id. (citing Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404, aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927)).
10. Id. at 512.
11. Id. at 512-16.
12. Id. at 513-14, 516-17.
13. Id. at 494-95.
14. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), which is the seminal case regarding absolute immunity of federal officials.
15. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens established that federal employees could be sued as
individuals for the violation of the constitutional rights of others. It also established that a
damage remedy was available in such cases. See notes 20-30 and accompanying text infra.
For a comprehensive discussion of the impact of Bivens, see Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government
Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 531 (1977).
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the Federal Constitution.""' These words of advice, however, remain ill-defined and probably will be the subject of future
litigation.
This article will identify the areas in which the public personnel manager can injure the constitutional interests of employees
and will analyze the impact of Economou and the availability of a
new remedy for constitutional transgressions committed by supervisors in the federal government. Much of the discussion is applicable to state and local officials through the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I.

The Legal Basis for Employee Causes of Action

Nearly ninety years ago, Justice Holmes wrote that a policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. '7 The view that public employment is a privilege revocable for any reasonable justification
has given way over the years to constitutionally based protections
for public employees which have been established by statutory and
decisional law."' In the wake of Economou, supervisors and administrators in the federal service will need to become even more
mindful of their employees' constitutional rights than they have
been in the past. Failure to do so may make them personally liable
to an employee for monetary damages.
Suits for money damages brought directly against public employees in their individual capacities have become an increasingly
common means of overcoming the barrier of sovereign immunity in
today's litigious society. 9 Economou has given great impetus to
that tendency.
16.
17.

438 U.S. at 507.
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).

18. For a recent survey of the law in this area, and a discussion of the death and
rebirth of the right-privilege distinction, see Note, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege
Distinction? A Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS

CONST. L.Q. 165 (1979).
19. The extent of litigation brought against the United States is described in Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Joint Hearing on S. 2117 Before the Subcomm. on
Citizens and ShareholdersRights & Remedies and the Subcomm. on Administrative Prac-

tice & Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See also
-STAFF REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE

COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RETENTION OF PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL TO
REPRESENT FEDERAL

EMPLOYEES

IN CIVIL LAwsuITs,

95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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The seminal case upon which Economou is based is Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents.20 The constitutional tort actions in
Bivens were originally based on violations of the Fourth Amendment and were brought under the federal question subject-matter
jurisdiction of the United States District Court.21 In creating what
has come to be known as a "constitutional tort," the Court in Bivens held that the violation of the Fourth Amendment "by a federal
agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of
action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional
conduct."22
In so holding, the Court relied on Bell v. Hood2s for the proposition that "where federally protected rights have been invaded,
it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."' 2 4 Bivens
addressed only Fourth Amendment violations, however, so that
lower courts were left to interpret for themselves the effect of Biv20. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States."
Federal employees may be sued in state courts for constitutional as well as common law
torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, misrepresentation and deceit. The Department of Justice may, and usually does, remove to federal court any action
in state court against a federal employee which arises out of an act done under color of his
federal office. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976) ("[a] civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following persons may be removed by them to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending: (1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person
acting under him, for any act under color of such office").
The "amount in controversy" requirement is generally not difficult to satisfy. "[T]he
sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to
justify dismissal. The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court
jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction." St. Paul Mercury Indemn.
Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938), quoted in Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1977).
In suits originally brought in state court, the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) need
not be satisfied because upon removal, the jurisdiction of the federal court is derivative. By
filing first in state court, a plaintiff is able to circumvent the "amount in controversy" requirement and litigate constitutional or common-law tort damage issues which may be of a
value less than $10,000. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939);
Gleason v. United States, 485 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1972).
22. 403 U.S. at 389.
23. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
24. 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684).
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ens, in light of Bell v. Hood, on other constitutional rights. Although some federal courts refused to extend the constitutional
tort theory to cases not directly involving the Fourth Amendment,25 many did apply the Bivens doctrine, not only to Fourth
Amendment violations but to violations of other constitutional
guarantees as well. 6 Currently, the constitutional tort doctrine has
been expanded and applied by the circuit courts in cases involving
the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.2
In Economou, the Supreme Court addressed the question
which had been considered by the courts of appeals of every circuit
in the wake of Bivens: Are public officials subject to constitutional
restraints? The Court answered this question directly: "[I]t cannot
be doubted that these officials, even when acting pursuant to congressional authorization, are subject to the restraints imposed by
the Federal Constitution."28 In light of Economou, it thus appears
that the Bivens doctrine provides a remedy for all constitutional
violations and that the federal courts will no longer recognize immunity in any case where a state official could be sued under the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866 or 1871.29 The Court explained in Economou that there is no basis for according federal officials a higher
degree of immunity from liability when they are sued for a constitutional infringement under Bivens than is accorded state officials
when they are sued for an identical violation under section 1983.
The responsibilities and standard of care are essentially the same
for both groups of employees. The Court concluded that federal
officials should enjoy no greater protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than that enjoyed by state officers. 30 Thus,
the exposure to civil liability for federal employees is considerably
broadened by the Economou decision.
Substantive and procedural rights benefiting federal employees are to be found in federal case law and various statutes and
25. See Lehmann, supra note 15, at 566 nn. 226 & 227 (for cases avoiding extension).
26. Id. at 567 n.229.
27. See note 25 supra.
28. 438 U.S. at 495.
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976). These provisions provide a substantive cause
of action-and perhaps more important, a federal forum-for the redress of constitutional
violations.
30. 438 U.S. at 504.
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regulations. These include the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,31
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,8 2 and. the Equal Em-

ployment Opportunities Act of 1972.33 Federal government supervisors taking action adverse to their employees' interests therefore
disregard pertinent cases, statutes and regulations at their peril,
since deprivations of rights found in the law and regulations may
give rise to an action for damages under the Fifth Amendment and
other constitutional provisions.
Within the last decade, the Federal Constitution has been construed to offer minimum protections to certain classes of public
employees. These constitutional protections can now be enforced
by Bivens-Economou suits by employees against supervisors or administrators in the federal government. Before turning to a discussion of Economou, it is appropriate to identify the constitutional
protections enjoyed by government employees which, if violated,
could give rise to constitutional tort liability. This analysis is offered to provide a framework in which to consider the true impact
of Economou.

II. Employee Rights Under the Constitution-An
Overview
A. Property and Liberty Rights
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of
law and are recognized as providing minimum employment protection for certain public employees. The due process clauses of these
amendments protect the liberty and property interests of employees who are affected by the adverse actions of their government
supervisors and give rise to procedural protections when those
rights are violated. Butz v. Economou34 extends this basic protection by giving rise to the personal liability of supervisors in certain
cases. Although the likelihood of success for such plaintiffs is not
great, after Economou the possibility of constitutional tort actions
against supervisors for wrongful discharge now exists.
31.
32.

33.
34.

5 U.S.C. § 2301 (Supp. 11 1979).
29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976).
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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Tenure rights are one example of property rights protected by
the due process clause. Where such property rights are violated by
a dismissal, the employee has a constitutional right to question the
grounds of the action taken against him. This concept of a "property interest in re-employment," or tenure, was discussed in 1972
in two companion cases involving college professors: Board of Re3 6 In Roth, the Court
gents v. Roth 5 and Perry v. Sindermann.
held that a non-tenured employee serving under his first one-year
contract does not have a "property interest" in renewal for a second year and therefore has no right to notice or a hearing, and may
be denied the opportunity to challenge his employer's reasons for
terminating his employment. The Court recognized that property
interests may take many forms, but that "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it ....
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." ' 37 The Court found that Mr.
Roth's contract did not give rise to any such expectation regarding
his continued employment. In Perry v. Sindermann, the Court
thoroughly analyzed the plaintiff's claim of entitlement by reviewing his employment history. The Court looked closely at the tenure
program, the rules, regulations and the eleven-year history of annual renewals of the plaintiff's employment contract. The Court
even assessed the subjective understandings of other employees.
The majority noted:
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that supports a teacher's claim
of entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient "cause"
is shown. Yet absence of such an explicit contractual proAsion
may not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a
"property" interest in reemployment .... Just as this Court has
found there to be a "common law of a particular industry or of a
particular plant" that may supplement a collective-bargaining
agreement,... so there may be an unwritten "common law" in a
particular university that certain employees shall have the
equivalent of tenure.3 8
Having found such tenure rights, the Court in Perry v.
Sindermann held that the respondent was entitled to a hearing in
35.

408 U.S. 564 (1972).

36.
37.
38.

408 U.S. 593 (1972).
408 U.S. 564, 577.
408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (citation omitted).
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which he could challenge the sufficiency of the grounds for his
nonretention.39
40
Tenure rights in the federal service are defined by statute.
An agency may take adverse action against an employee who has
completed one year of continuous employment and is not serving a
probationary trial period.'only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service."4 1 Where adverse action is limited to suspension for fourteen days, such employees have a statutory right to
written notice stating specific reasons for the proposed action.42
They also may retain an attorney or other representation, may
comment orally or in writing, and must be permitted the opportunity to furnish affidavits and documents prior to any decision. 43
Employees also are entitled to a specific statement of reasons for
the agency's final decision.

4

Simflar rights on a specified timetable

are provided where removal, suspension for more than fourteen
days, reduction in grade or pay, or forced furlough is sought,4 5 although the statute specifically excludes certain employees and
46
actions.
In a three-justice plurality opinion, in Arnett v. Kennedy,47
the Supreme Court upheld a federal statutory scheme which provides for specific due process rights that fall short of the constitutional standard. The Court reasoned that where federal employees'
property rights are limited by the same law under which those
39. Id. at 603.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970). See Exec. Order No. 10,880, 25 Fed. Reg. 5131 (1960),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
5 U.S.C. § 7512 (1976 & Supp. III 1980) states that an adverse action includes: (1) a
removal; (2) a suspension for more than 14 days; (3) a reduction in grade; (4) a reduction in
pay; and (5) a furlough of 30 days or less, but exempts suspension of removal action deemed
necessary in the interest of national security by the head of an agency. Section 7503 sets
forth procedures for suspension of 14 days or less. Section 7513 sets forth procedures, distinct from those of § 7503, for removal, suspensions of longer duration, reduction in grade or
pay, or furlough.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 7503(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
43. Id. at § 7503(b)(2) & (3).
44. Id. at § 7503(b)(4).
45. Id. at § 7513.
46. Id. at §9 7511-12. Suspension or removal deemed in the interest of national security by an agency head, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7532, reductions in grade of a supervisor or
manager who has not completed the probationary period under 5 U.S.C. § 3321, reductionsin-grade of probationary supervisors, reductions-in-grade or removal under 5 U.S.C. § 4303
(1978), and action initiated under 5 U.S.C. §§ 1206 or 7521.
47. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).

680

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:671

rights are created, the employee is constitutionally limited in seeking a remedy. For example, where tenure rights are created by a
statute which establishes limited employee due process procedures,
not encompassing the right to a full hearing, employees will not be
allowed to attack the constitutionality of procedures prescribed by
the Act from which the tenure benefits are derived. Employees
"must take the bitter with the sweet.14 8 In such cases it is left to
the legislative branch to define the appropriate procedures. However, the applicable government agency must be careful to comply
with the legislative scheme when taking adverse action against an
employee. To deviate from the scheme may constitute a depriva49
tion of a constitutionally protected property interest.
Probationers and untenured employees have substantially
fewer rights than tenured employees. 50 This is because probationers do not have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to their position. Thus, they do not possess a property interest and enjoy no
constitutionally protected right to due process when adverse actions are taken,51 unless a liberty interest is implicated by the
manner in which they are dismissed.
The extent of an employee's liberty interest was described in
Wisconsin v. Constantineau:52 "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential. '53 For a probationer, such a hearing will not result in
reinstatement, but only provides the employee with an opportunity
to clear his name. Where adverse action is taken against an employee, however, and the nature of the action affects his good
48. Id. at 154. The court has continued to diminish the due process rights afforded to
public employees. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Note, supra note 18.
49. See Hortonville Joint-School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n., 426 U.S. 482 (1976);
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (an agency must follow its own regulations); Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976). In Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) the court held that where an agency does grant a full hearing, it is of a quasijudicial character, and due process requires that it be open to the press and public.
50. Compare 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.201-.203 (1980) with §§ 752.301-.406 (1980).
51. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S.
61 (1974); Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1973); 5 U.S.C. §
7511 (Supp. I1 1980) (defining employees covered by the Civil Service Reform Act, supra
note 31, which excludes probationary employees from adverse action protections).
52. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
53. Id. at 437. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 (making it clear that this
concept applies to public employees).
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name, reputation, honor or integrity, supervisors may be liable for
injuring the employee's constitutionally protected interest. Undue
deprivation of such a liberty interest may give rise to a BivensEconomou suit brought directly under the Constitution as an analog to the common-law tort of defamation. Publicizing the grounds
for discharge may have the necessary stigmatizing effect.5 4 A person is not deprived of liberty if he remains free to seek another job
and there is no public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge. 5
When his reputation and ability to seek further employment are
affected, however, a liberty interest is implicated because the attendant stigma forecloses the freedom to take advantage of other
5 7 preemployment opportunities.8 6 Churchwell v. United States
sented such a case.
In Churchwell, a probationary registered nurse was discharged
without a pretermination hearing for "'conduct on the job, and irregularities in the inventory of controlled drugs, occurring during
[her] tour of duty as charge nurse.' "" A Standard Form 50 was
placed in her personnel file stating that she was discharged "'for
not meeting the standards set forth for a professional nurse.'
Under governing regulations, this form was available to subsequent
employers for their review. The court determined that a stigma
had attached. 9
A probationer deprived of a hearing will not be entitled to reinstatement, although a court may order the removal from his personnel file of any stigmatizing material.6 0 Furthermore, in any suit
alleging a deprivation of liberty due to stigma, the employee must
allege that the stigmatizing material in the file is untrue. 1
Many questions remain concerning the definition of stigma
and the defenses available to allegations of an Economou constitutional tort for the deprivation of an employee's liberty interest. It
54.
55.
56.
U.S. 693

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974).
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
408 U.S. at 573; see also Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424
(1976). Paul v. Davis makes it clear that stigma alone is insufficient. Courts will

require that real and measurable injury be demonstrated.
57. 545 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 60 (quoting letter of termination dated May 5, 1975).
59.

Id. at 62-63. See also Missouri ex rel. Gore v. Wochner, 620 F.2d 183 (8th Cir.

1980).
60.

Casey v. Roudebush, 395 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1975).

61. Id. at 63.
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appears that where untrue statements by a supervisor result in the
employee's discharge, reduction of employment opportunities, or
injury to the employee's reputation, a damage action against the
supervisor may lie.6 2 It seems equally clear, however, that a liberty
interest will not be found and that the affected employee will not
be entitled to a hearing or to a cause of action for a constitutional
tort in the following cases: (1) where the reasons for dismissal are
accurate and not disputed by the employee; (2) where the reasons
for dismissal (whether accurate or not) are not disclosed outside
the employing agency; or (3) where the reasons for dismissal may
damage the employee's reputation, but not to the extent of foreclosing other employment opportunities.
B.

First Amendment Free Speech Protections

In order to ensure basic efficiency in public service, broader
limitations than those which affect the general public may be
placed on public employees' First Amendment rights. The seminal
3 The Court
case on this issue is Pickering v. Board of Education."
in Pickering noted that "[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. '8 4 In upholding Pickering's right to free speech, the. Supreme Court declined to lay down
a general standard; it simply stated that all speech is to be balanced on a case-by-case basis against the employer's interest in
maintaining the efficiency of the service. In Pickering, it could
neither be shown nor presumed that Pickering's public statements,
which were critical of school board fiscal policy, in any way impeded the teachers' proper job performance or interfered with the
general operation of the schools. The Court held that school fund62. See Churchwell v. United States, 545 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976); Velger v. Cawley, 525
F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1975), reu'd on other grounds sub nom. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624
(1977); United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975); Rolles v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
512 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College, 487 F.2d 153

(8th Cir. 1973); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973); Giordano v. Roudebush, 448
F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Iowa 1977); Casey v. Roudebush, 395 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1975); Lindsay
v. Kissinger, 367 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1973). Regarding stigma, see also Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
63.
64.

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 568.
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ing is a matter of legitimate public concern and that open debate is
vital to informed decisionmaking by the electorate. But the Court
noted that false statements, made knowingly and recklessly, are a
disservice to public debate and can adversely affect the decisionmaking process.""
The Court in Pickeringidentified certain factors involving significant governmental interests sufficient to overcome the ordinary
presumption favoring an employee's First Amendment right to
criticize his employer, supervisor or fellow employee. These factors
include: (1) the need for maintaining discipline and harmony in
the agency; 6 (2) the need for confidentiality of agency affairs;67 (3)
the need to protect the overall operation of the employer; 8 (4) the
need to insure that the employee's ability to perform duties has
not been diminished as a result of the employee's having made unfounded statements;69 and (5) the need to maintain close, personal
working relationships requiring personal loyalty and confidence.70
Some lower courts have held that public statements concerning
matters not of public concern, recurring disputes with superiors,
and extremely disrespectful and1 grossly offensive remarks are beyond constitutional protection.
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 2 a government employee was discharged for publicly accusing his superior of bribery. The Supreme
Court determined that the subordinate's public criticism seriously
undermined the effectiveness of the working relationship and "improperly" damaged and impaired the reputation and efficiency of
the employing agency. Consequently, the Court held that the employee's discharge could not be constitutionally prohibited, and
stated:
The phrase "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the ser65. Knowingly false statements and false statements made with reckless disregard of
the truth have been denied constitutional protection. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964). However, the Court declined to consider whether such statements are protected if
they have no harmful effects. 391 U.S. at 574 n.6.
66.

391 U.S. at 569-70 n.3.

67. Id. at 570.
68. Id. at 573.
69. Id. at 572-73.
70. Id. at 570.
71. See, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1975); Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1973); Chitwood v. Feaster,
468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972).
72.

416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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vice" as a standard of employee job protection is without doubt
intended to authorize dismissal for speech as well as other conduct. . . .[I]n certain situations the discharge of a Government
employee may be based on his speech without offending guarantees of the First Amendment."7
The Court in Arnett cited with approval the District of Columbia
Circuit opinion in Meehan v. Macy,74 which stated:
[I]t is not feasible or necessary for the Government to spell out in
detail all that conduct which will result in retaliation. The most
conscientious of codes that define prohibited conduct of employees includes "catchall" clauses prohibiting employee "misconduct," "immorality," or "conduct unbecoming." We think it is inherent in the employment relationship as a matter of common
sense if not [of] common law that [a government] employee...
cannot reasonably assert a right to keep his job while at the same
time he inveighs against his superiors in public with intemperate
and defamatory [cartoons] .... [Dismissal in such circumstances
neither] comes as an unfair surprise [nor] is so unexpected and
uncertain as to chill ... freedom to engage in appropriate
speech.75
The existence of a special superior-subordinate relationship
may constitute a significant factor in the balancing of interests. In
Sprague v. Fitzpatrick,"' an assistant district attorney publicly
disputed the truth of statements made to the press by the district
attorney. The court, applying the Pickering balancing test, found
that the crucial variant in this case was the hierarchical proximity
of the criticizing employee to the person criticized as well as the
close working relationship, mutual confidence and cooperation
which were necessary for the smooth operation of the District Attorney's office." The court distinguished Pickering, in which the
teacher's statements were in no way directed toward any person
with whom he would normally come into contact in the course of
his *daily work.78 Sprague v. Fitzpatrick suggests that the closer
the proximity of persons affected by the speech in issue, the
greater the chances that harmonious relationships with superiors
73. 416 U.S. at 160 (citations omitted).
74. 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir.), remanded, 425 F.2d 469 (1968), aff'd en banc, 425 F.2d
472 (1969).
75. 392 F.2d at 835.
76. 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977).
77. 546 F.2d at 565-66.
78. Id. at 565.

Summer 1981]

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY OF SUPERVISORS

and co-workers will be affected. "If the arousal of public controversy exacerbates the disruption of public service, then it weighs
against, not for, First Amendment protection in the Pickering balance. 17 9 Where a person's role as a direct administrative and policymaking subordinate of the person criticized is involved, courts
will find that the efficiency of the service is affected.
As a general rule, when the employment relationship is seriously undermined by what a subordinate says, First Amendment
protections will not apply, and adverse action may be taken
against that employee. As previously noted, however, adverse impact on the superior-subordinate relationship is not the sole criterion to be weighed in the Pickering balance. In Sprague, the court
also considered the impact of public criticism, since the content of
speech certainly becomes more significant when it is made publicly
rather than within the agency. 0 Such public speech may lead to
public debate, embroil an agency in controversy, result in dissension and inefficiency, and cause unwarranted difficulties in the
work place. But while public speech may be reasonably limited, at
least one case suggests that entirely different considerations might
apply to intra-agency speech.
In Ring v. Schlesinger,"" the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit discussed Roth, Sindermann,
Arnett, and Pickering. That case involved a teacher who sent a
memorandum entitled "Richard Bushman's incompetency and lack
of ethics as principal of George Cannon School" to four high-level
administrators within the agency. Since no public statement was
made and dissemination was internally limited, the court of appeals suggested that any adverse effect on the agency's efficiency
would be limited8 2 and remanded the case, directing the district
court to apply the appropriate balancing test. 3
A contrary result was reached by the Fifth Circuit, however, in
Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District.84 In that
79. Id. at 566.
80. Id. at 565. See Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 922 (1970) (civilian employee of the United States Air Force who taught basic
English to foreign military officers was dismissed after making statements in the classroom
critical of the United States).
81. 502 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 489.
83. Id. at 490.
84. 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated & remanded sub nom. Givhan v. Western
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case, a vocal teacher persisted in taking lists of requests, or demands, to the principal. Included were requests that certain
"choice" jobs be given to blacks, that the school administration
and staff be better integrated, and that certain black workers be
assigned semi-clerical rather than janitorial work. The principal
recommended against rehiring the teacher "because of her 'arrogance and antagonistic and hostile relationship,' manifested in...
her 'unreasonable demands.' "8
After analyzing Pickering, Sindermann and Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle,88 the Fifth Circuit
announced that "[t]he three leading Supreme Court cases on
teacher dismissals and freedom of speech illustrate the importance
of protecting the right of public expression. ' 87 The court concluded that "[t]he strong implication of these cases is that private
expression by a public employee is not constitutionally protected"
and that "no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient."8 8 For this reason, the court held that the teacher
had not engaged in constitutionally protected speech, and that
"[n]either a teacher nor a citizen has a constitutional right to single out a public employee to serve as the audience for his or her
privately expressed views."89
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded.9 0 In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist, the Court expressly rejected the circuit court's reasoning,
stating:
This Court's decisions in Pickering, Perry and Mt. Healthy do
not support the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his
protection against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech
if he decides to express his views privately rather than publicly.
While those cases each arose in the context of a public employee's
public expression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on that largely coincidental fact.91
Line Consol.
85. 555
86. 429
87. 555
88. Id.

School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
F.2d at 1314.
U.S. 274 (1977).
F.2d at 1317 (emphasis added).
at 1318-19 (footnote & citations omitted). See also City of Madison Joint

School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
89.
90.
91.

555 F.2d at 1319.
Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 414.
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In cases where First Amendment rights are involved, the employee must first establish that "his constitutionally protected conduct played a 'substantial' role in the employer's decision not to
rehire him. 9'

2

The burden then shifts to the employer to establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision even without consideration of the protected
expression. 3
An employee may establish that adverse action taken against
the employee by an agency was based on the exercise of free
speech and may sue the charging supervisor in a personal capacity.
As will be discussed later, however, the likelihood of recovery may
be remote. Courts may be more likely to order reinstatement and
back pay or find a valid qualified immunity. Litigation nevertheless may be avoided through awareness of the constitutional parameters of free speech protection. 4 The alert supervisor will
clearly establish in the record either that the basis for his decision
does not involve the exercise of protected free speech or that
speech was not a substantial factor and that the supervisor relied
on factors wholly independent of statements the employee may
have made. 5
92. Id. at 416.
93. Id.; Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
94. A related First Amendment question-whistle-blowing to Congress-is recognized
in 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1978), which provides that "[tihe right of employees, individually or
collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to
either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with
or denied."
Where an employee has testified before Congress or communicated with his representative, alert supervisors will be mindful of this provision. In any First Amendment case, however, if there is a separate and wholly independent basis for adverse action, the fact of the
employee's speech should not deter the employer from good faith action against the employee. In Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, the Court noted that "[a] borderline or
marginal candidate should not have the employment question resolved against him because
of constitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate ought not to be able, by
engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance record
and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its decision." 429 U.S.
at 286. The Court in Mt. Healthy went on to consider the issue of results flowing from a
constitutional violation by analogizing to the law of confessions, taint and dissipation discussion in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338 (1939).
95. 429 U.S. at 285-86.
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C. Fourth Amendment Protections
The Fourth Amendment provides for "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 6 This protection applies to areas in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
freedom from governmental intrusion and has been extended to office spaces, desks and other areas used by employees. In Mancusi
v. DeForte,97 the Supreme Court recognized that a person has
standing to object to a search of his office as well as his home. The
Court determined that had DeForte occupied a private office,
seizure of records from a desk or filing cabinet in that office without either a warrant or his consent would violate the Fourth
Amendment.' The Court further concluded that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists even in an office shared with fellow employees. 9 In Villano v. United States,100 an employee's desk, of
which he had neither ownership nor exclusive possession, was
searched over his objection. The Tenth Circuit held that the desk
was protected by the Fourth Amendment.101 In United States v.
Blok, 102 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals extended the
Fourth Amendment protection to a desk in a government office
which was assigned for the exclusive use of a single employee,
holding that the search was unlawful with neither consent nor a
warrant.103
Zones of privacy are not limited to desks. The same rationale
may be extended to coats on hangers, lockers used exclusively by a
single employee, attach6 cases, wastebaskets, and similarly private
areas.10 ' It is important to note that a claim of Fourth Amendment
96.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

97. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
98. Id. at 369.
99.

Id. It is settled that a person has standing to object to a search of his private office.

See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); but see Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
100. 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962).

101. Id. at 683.
102. 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
103. Id. at 1020-21.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 989 (1975) (search of a locker); Nixon v. Sampson, 398 F. Supp. 107, 156 (D.D.C. 1975)
(reasonable expectation of privacy discussed); United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784

(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (wastebasket).,
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protection turns not upon any property right in the desk, locker or
area searched, but rather upon the reasonable expectation of privacy or freedom from governmental intrusion. 10 5 This "reasonable
expectation" has been defined by the Ninth Circuit: "The protection of the Fourth Amendment no longer depends upon 'constitutionally protected' places. Instead, we must consider 'first that a
person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "106 United States v. Bunkers1 07 recognizes that zones of privacy may be limited by agency regulations or
union agreements. 10 8 Because the Postal Manual provided that
Bunkers' locker was "subject to search" and because her union
agreement recognized that searches could be conducted, the court
concluded that Bunkers' locker was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment and that a warrantless search was neither unreasonable nor unlawful. 0 9
Fourth Amendment problems, then, generally arise when a
search is conducted of a person or his property where a zone of
privacy exists, but certain common situations do not involve a
"search." What a person leaves in "plain view" or otherwise
"knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection."11 0 Furthermore,
when an authorized inventory or inspection is conducted, a search
does not technically occur."1 1 The lack of law enforcement or police
purpose in an inspection effort also bears upon whether a search
105. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 352 (1967).
106. United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting United
States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 1972)).
107. 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975).
108. Id. at 1221. Part 643 of the Postal Manual provided that the locker in question,
which .was furnished incident to employment by the Postal Service, was "to be used for
[her] convenience and . . . [was] subject to search by supervisors and postal inspectors."
The union agreement with the Postal Service recognized but restricted locker searches by
providing that "[e]xcept in matters where there is reasonable cause to suspect criminal activity, a steward or an employee shall be given the opportunity to be present in any inspection of employees' lockers." Id. at 1219.
109. Id. at 1219-20.
110. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
111. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (opinion by Stewart, J.)
(search and seizure of car); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (seizure of car
registration).
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has occurred. 112 In United States v. Kahan,11 3 a New York District
Court discussed whether a criminal investigator's rummaging
through an Immigration and Naturalization Service employee's
wastebasket constituted a search. The court determined:
This is not a case where an office supervisor or fellow employee in
a government office is looking for some needed document or record and inadvertently happens upon incriminating evidence in
the desk or wastebasket of another employee. Nor is it a situation
where a supervisor is inspecting the area used by a subordinate in
order to examine his work or to evaluate his performance on the
job. There is no doubt that the government should be able to
manage its agencies and offices effectively and without undue restrictions on the supervision of its employees. What would be normal in the supervision and control of employees in a private business should be allowable in government offices as well. Thus, to
assure efficiency and honesty, government supervisors have au11 4
thority to oversee the work of their employees.
The court went on to distinguish specifically focused investigations
of criminal activity from employer supervision or inspection activities. It explained that when a government supervisor begins an investigation of an employee because he suspects criminal conduct,
he abandons his role as manager and becomes a criminal investigator for the government. Here the supervisor is no longer acting "to
preserve efficiency in the office," but rather is preparing "a criminal prosecution against the employee." 11 5 The court held that such
searches and seizures by supervisors or other government agents
fall within the Fourth Amendment and that a search warrant must
be obtained before they may be conducted.11 6
Inadvertent discoveries made while looking for government
papers or property may not transgress the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, a supervisor's authority to search a government desk
or look through government or jointly used property is not generally considered to be a search of the employee's effects. 1 ' In addition, if the property and effects belong to the Government exclu112. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (permitting welfare caseworker to visit
home without conducting a search of constitutional proportions).
113. 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
114. Id. at 791 (dictum).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Blok, 188
F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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sively, the employee enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection
against search and seizure.
A search that reveals inculpatory contraband, material or information can lead to adverse action and possibly to criminal prosecution. In criminal proceedings, the exclusionary rule may protect
the employee where the supervisor improperly conducts an investigatory search. The exclusionary rule has no application, however,
in intra-agency disciplinary proceedings, and it is entirely possible
that an invasion of the employee's Fourth Amendment rights can
still lead to his discharge. Bivens establishes that the courts may
be willing to imply a constitutional tort remedy where no other
remedy exists." 8 The law as it related to Economou is unsettled.
The courts either can award damages for the invasion of privacy
or, if criminal conduct is involved and the exclusionary rule is applicable, can refuse to imply a Bivens action since the employee is
not without any recognized remedy. Where a supervisor invades a
constitutionally protected area and fails to discover contraband or
other evidence, however, the supervisor could be held liable in a
Bivens action for money damages.
D.
1.

Fifth Amendment Protections
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."1 1 9 This
Amendment also protects the witness if he is called to testify
against himself in a civil or criminal proceeding where his answers
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.1 20 Although
it is unlikely that a Fifth Amendment Bivens-Economou suit
against a superior based on intra-agency interview procedures
118. In Kahan, the court noted that whether an employee could claim Fourth Amendment protection in a government office had been less clear than the private office situation,
but found that public employees are entitled to the benefits of the Constitution, just like
anyone else. The court relied on several Fifth Amendment cases which it believed to imply
that the public employee retains the Fourth Amendment protection while employed in a
government office. 350 F. Supp. at 794. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968);
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
119. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
120. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40
(1924).
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would be successful,12' the basic protections are nevertheless relevant to employer and employee conduct.
Although the government has a strong legitimate interest in
maintaining the integrity of its civil service, public employees do
not lose their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by
virtue of having accepted public employment. An agency may
grant its employee immunity from prosecution where there is a
public interest sufficient to secure an accounting of the public
trust. Having acquired immunity, the employee must answer potentially incriminating questions concerning his official duties, and
such "criminally immune" public employees may be constitutionally discharged for refusing to answer questions. Although they
may not be prosecuted for their answers once immunity has been
granted, they may be discharged as a result of them. 22
Gardner v. Broderick123 stated that without a grant of immunity, an employee may not be constitutionally discharged for refusing to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. In the companion case of
Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner, 24 public employees
were officially interrogated and were advised that refusal to sign
waivers of immunity would lead to their dismissal. The Court
found this procedure unconstitutional because the state had
presented the employees with "a choice between surrendering their
constitutional rights or their jobs.' 25 Garrity v. New Jersey,26
likewise held that a statement obtained involuntarily under threat
of adverse action is inadmissable in any criminal proceeding. Thus,
if threats are employed or if the interview is coercive, the employee
will have a de facto grant of immunity, as was implied in Garrity.
The same result obtains when the employer fails to warn an em121. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Garrityrelied on dictum in McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892): "The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his
constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms that are offered him. On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
122. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70
(1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
123. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
124. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
125. Id. at 284.
126. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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ployee of the consequences of his statements or of his Fifth
Amendment privilege. 127 It is axiomatic that an employee who, after being warned of his jeopardy, cooperates in an investigation or
interview and speaks voluntarily may be discharged for any misconduct he reveals.12 8
Supervisors and agency investigators must comply with the
federal regulatory scheme that parallels the state and municipal
regulations involved in Garrity,Sanitation Men and the Lefkowitz
cases and requires the employee to answer questions only in certain circumstances. Agencies of the federal government are free to
promulgate their own regulations defining offenses and providing
sanctions. Under authority granted by Executive Order, 2 9 for example, the Navy Department has promulgated regulations creating
specific offenses.13 0 "[F]alse testimony or refusal to testify in an
inquiry, investigation or other official proceeding" 3 " is punishable
with sanctions ranging from reprimand to removal. "Falsification,
misstatement or concealment of material fact in connection with
13 2
any official record" carries the same punishment.
The likelihood of success in a Bivens-Economou suit for violation of an an employee's constitutional rights under such circumstances is unclear. It would seem that a damages claim would lie,
for example, where a supervisor who is required to advise an employee of the possible consequences of his answers or his right to
remain silent fails to do so. If the employee admits facts that lead
to his discharge, however, the discharge will probably be permitted
to stand even though a de facto grant of immunity from prosecution is created by the supervisor's conduct. No case has interpreted
the Fifth Amendment as barring adverse administrative action
taken as a result of information obtained in violation of that
Amendment. We are unaware of authority which would require reinstatement in such a situation. Even so the courts may prohibit a
constitutional tort recovery on the ground that the employee already possesses a "remedy" in the form of de facto immunity,
which is comparable to the exclusionary rule. This factor is dis127.
128.
129.
130.
(Oct. 20,
131.
132.

Id. See Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
Womer v. Hampton, 496 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1974).
Exec. Order No. 9,830, 12 Fed. Reg. 1259 (1947).
Dep't of Navy Adverse Actions, CVILIAN PERSONNEL INSTRUCTIONS 752, app. B-7
1980).
Id.
Id.
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cussed at length by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens. 1 as
2. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
Sex discrimination by the federal government violates the
Fifth Amendment.1 3 4 Although it is clear that gender-based classifications must withstand equal protection scrutiny, only intermediate scrutiny will be employed by the Supreme Court. 35 Similarly,
gender-based retaliation cases also may give rise to constitutional
tort liability.13 6 This question was recently presented in Davis v.
Passman, 37 wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
imply a remedy, 3 ' but the Supreme Court granted certiorari 39 and
reversed on June 5, 1979.140
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action and a
damage remedy may be implied directly under the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
to redress sex discrimination in federal employment." The plaintiff in Davis was a congressional employee unprotected by Title
VII. That there was no remedy available to redress the sex discrimination was an important factor in the Court's decision. 42 The
scope of employee remedies available when Title VII is applicable
133. 403 U.S. at 414-22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 95 n.1 (1979); Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975).
135. "To withstand scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, 'classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)).
136. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). Cf. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (where a female government employee's job was abolished because she refused
her male supervisor's sexual advances, the appropriate remedy was in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)).
137. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
138. 571 F.2d at 800.
139. 439 U.S. 925 (1978).
140. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
141. Id. at 244.
142. Id. at 245. The Court noted that equitable relief in the form of reinstatement
could not be ordered because Passman was no longer in Congress; nor was the petitioner's
claim actionable under state law, "since it involves the application of the Fifth Amendment
to a federal officer in the course of his federal duties." Id. at 246 n.23. These factors compelled the conclusion that the federal court was the most appropriate forum. Davis is discussed in notes 195-206 and accompanying text infra.
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will be explored in the next section.
III. The Implication of Constitutional Torts in
Title VII Cases
A. The Implication of a Constitutional Tort Cause of
Action
After Brown v. General Services Administration,4 s most
courts were reluctant to imply a constitutional tort where a Title
VII remedy existed. But in Broshnahan v. Eckerd,1" an employee
brought a Title VII employment discrimination claim against the
General Services Administration and against agency officials who
were sued in their individual capacities for alleged violations of
plaintiff's constitutional rights. The several named defendants allegedly had been responsible for plaintiff's wrongful discharge from
the General Services Administration. The government, relying on
Brown v. General Services Administration,4 5 filed a motion to dis-

miss contending that the -damage action brought against individual
defendants was precluded by the existence of Title VII remedies.
The court distinguished Brown v. ,GeneralServices Administration
on the ground that the plaintiff in that case had not filed his complaint in a timely fashion, and suggested the "delicate balance of
administrative and judicial remedies in Title VII," 1 8 a factor relied on by the Supreme Court as a basis of decision in Brown v.
General Services Administration, would not be upset by a suit
brought under section 1985(3) of Title 42 of the United States
Code, and the Constitution. This is so, the court reasoned, because
"[t]he damage action seeks special remedies, not merely equitable
relief from employment discrimination, and is not foreclosed by
' 47
the enactment of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. M
Similarly, the district court in Founding Church of
Scientology, Inc. v. FBP48 held that where only injunctive relief is
sought against named federal employees, Title VII is the exclusive
143. 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (holding that § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the
exclusive remedy available to a federal employee complaining of employment
discrimination).
144. 435 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1977).
145. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
146. 435 F. Supp. at 28.
147. Id.
148. 459 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1978).
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remedy for religious discrimination. " 9
Whether or not to imply a constitutional cause of action where
a Title VII remedy is available was also addressed in Neely v. Blumenthal1 50 and Davis v. Passman. 51 In the Neely opinion, handed
down just seven days after the Economou decision was released,152
Judge John J. Sirica declined to imply a remedy for discrimination
under the Fifth Amendment for an employee covered by Title
V.1 153 In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a congressional employee, not covered by Title VII, stated a cause of action for damages under the Fifth Amendment when she alleged that she was
discharged because of her sex.'"
When assessing whether to imply a constitutional remedy
where a statutory remedy exists, the courts have relied on Bivens
to the extent that it implied a remedy only because no other remedy was available to the plaintiff. Webster Bivens had brought an
action for damages against federal narcotics agents who allegedly
used unreasonable force both in searching his apartment and in
arresting him without either a warrant or probable cause. The Supreme Court held that federal courts have the power to award
damages for violations of constitutionally protected interests. In
deciding if an award of compensatory damages was "necessary" or
"appropriate" to the vindication of Bivens' interest, Justice Harlan
noted that some form of damages was the only possible remedy for
someone in Bivens' position, that no adequate remedy existed
under state law, that a suit against the United States for acts of its
agents was barred by sovereign immunity, that injunctive relief
was not appropriate, and that "[flor people in Bivens' shoes, it is
'55
damages or nothing.'
Bivens' suit for damages from federal narcotics agents for the
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights was allowed by the Supreme Court.
That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a
violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 759.
458 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1978).
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
Neely was decided on July 6, 1978, and did not consider Economou.
458 F. Supp. at 960.
442 U.S. at 244.
403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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hardly seem a surprising proposition. Historically, damages have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty.....
Of course, the Fourth Amendment does
not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of
money damages for the consequences of its violation. But "it is
.. .well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done."'118
The Court noted that there had been no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by federal officers were barred from
recovering damages. 15 7 Relying on Marbury v. Madison, the Court
added that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury."'158
Having concluded that a remedy must be afforded those
wronged by federal officials who transgress constitutional bounds,
the Court considered whether a remedy could be created judicially.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
had essentially reasoned that
(1) the framers of the Fourth Amendment did not appear to contemplate a "wholly new federal cause of action founded directly
on the Fourth Amendment,". . . and (2) while the federal courts
had power under a general grant of jurisdiction to imply a federal
remedy for the enforcement of a constitutional right, they should
do so only when the absence of alternative remedies renders the
constitutional command a "mere 'form of words.' 159
The Supreme Court disagreed:
The contention that the federal courts are powerless to accord a
litigant damages for a claimed invasion of his federal constitutional rights until Congress explicitly authorizes the remedy cannot rest on the notion that the decision to grant compensatory
relief involves a resolution of policy considerations not susceptible
of judicial discernment. Thus, in suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any express authorizationof a
damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief where, in
its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional
156.
157.
158.
159.

403 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
403 U.S. at 397.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 399 (Harlan J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute.160

The Court seemed to suggest that, absent congressional restrictions, the scope of equitable remedial discretion and inherent equitable power is very broad.112
In Economou, the Court referred to the Bivens decision in its
discussion of whether a remedy could be implied." 2 Several points
made by the Court are instructive:
The presence or absence of congressional authorization for

suits against federal officials is, of course, relevant to the question
of whether to infer a right of action for damages for a particular

violation of the Constitution. In Bivens the Court noted the "absence of affirmative action by Congress" and therefore looked for
"special factors counselling hesitation." Absent congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think more carefully
about whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages, and whether the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the plaintiff's
claim. 163
From the Court's discussion in Bivens and Economou emerges
an extremely broad equitable power in the courts to grant redress
of monetary damages against responsible officials under the general federal question jurisdiction of the district court. Significantly,
neither Bivens nor Economou involved claims for relief which were
also subject to comprehensive legislation such as Title VII. For actions under the Civil Rights Acts,18 ' individual officials would
clearly be amenable to suits for damages after Economou because,
as indicated above, Economou points out that federal officials are
subject to restraints imposed by the Federal Constitution. As a
threshold matter, the courts must consider whether the statutory
remedy is intended to be exclusive and whether it is appropriate to
imply a Bivens-Economou remedy under the Constitution. The
court must then determine: (1) whether damages are "'necessary'
or 'appropriate' for the vindication of plaintiff's interest;" (2)
160. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 404. The Court also noted, however, that "the federal judiciary is not empowered to grant equitable relief in the absence of Congressional action extending jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit." Id.
162. 438 U.S. at 504.
163. Id. at 503 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 396-97,
409).
164. Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976).
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whether there exist "special factors counselling hesitation;" (3)
whether the type of injury involved is normally compensable in
damages, and (4) whether the courts are qualified to handle the
plaintiff's claim.
A recent case sheds some light on the Court's willingness to
permit a constitutional tort action against a government official
even when another remedy is available. In Carlson v. Green,16 5 the
United States Supreme Court held that a Bivens remedy is available to a plaintiff even though an alternative remedy exists under
the Federal Tort Claims Act."'8 In Green, the administratrix of an
estate brought suit against the director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, alleging that the decedent, while a prisoner in an Indiana
federal prison, suffered fatal injuries due to the respondent's failure to provide medical care in violation of decedent's Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the suit, claiming
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed. 6 7
The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Cir-

cuit"68

and embellished upon

it.

1

69

The Court first restated the

holding in Bivens that "the victims of a constitutional violation by
a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official
in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such
a right. 1 7 0 Such a claim for relief may be defeated where (1) "special factors counselling hesitation" are present,17 1 or where (2) an
alternative remedy is present which "Congress has. . . declared to
be a substitute for recovery directly under the constitution and
viewed as equally effective. 1 7 2 The Court, noting that neither situation was evident in the case, allowed the recovery of damages
against the federal official for the constitutional violation. 173
165. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
166. Id. at 20.
167. 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978).
168. 446 U.S. at 24.
169. The primary issue adjudicated-whether a Bivens action can be maintained notwithstanding the availability of a FTCA remedy-was first presented in the petition for

certiorari. 446 U.S. at 17 n.2.
170. Id. at 18.
171. Id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 396).
172.
173.

446 U.S. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 25. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Torres v. Taylor, 456

F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hernandez v. Lattimore, 454 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
rev'd, 612 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1979).
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B. Title VII as an Exclusive Remedy
Broshnahan v. Eckerd"'4 stands alone among a number of
United States District Court holdings which reach a contrary result on the question of whether the district court has jurisdiction
to entertain a constitutional tort suit in conjunction with or instead of a Title VII claim. 7 5 The leading case on the point, distinguished in Broshnahan, is Brown v. General Services
7I
Administration. 6
Clarence Brown, a black employee of the General Services Administration, filed suit alleging employment discrimination violative of Title VII and section 1981.11" The district court dismissed
the complaint, and its decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit,

which held that section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, was the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination. The circuit court also held that the complaint had not been

timely filed.'78
The Supreme Court affirmed, 7 noting that the legislative debates and the structure of the 1972 amendment extending Title
VII to federal employees indicated that "the congressional intent
in 1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and
judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination." 8 0 The Court distinguished private employee remedies under
Title VII, which are not exclusive, since sovereign immunity is not

an issue and since the legislative history of the 1964 Act
174. 435 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1977). See notes 144-48 and accompanying text supra.
175. See, e.g., James v. Rumsfeld, 580 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1978); Scott v. Perry, 569
F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1978); Swain v. Hoffman, 547 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1977); Gissen v.
Tackman, 537 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1976); Stith v. Barnwell, 447 F. Supp. 970 (M.D.N.C. 1978);
Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1978); Carter v. Marshall, 457 F. Supp. 38
(D.D.C. 1978); Berio v. EEOC, 446 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1978); Tapp v. United States, No.
77-1296 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 9, 1977) (unpublished opinion); Beckwith v. Hampton, 430 F.
Supp. 183 (D.D.C. 1977); Dual v. Roudebush, No. 76-005 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 9, 1977) (unpublished opinion); Royal v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1977); Marynowych v. Boorstin,
No. 76-1480 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 8, 1977) (unpublished opinion); Beeman v. Middendorf, 425
F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1977); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1977); Pace v.
Mathews, No. 78-99 (D.D.C. filed July 22, 1976) (unpublished opinion); Tufts v. United
States Postal Service, 431 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Gaballah v. Roudebush, 421 F.
Supp. 475 (N.D. Ill.
1976); Allen v. Crosby, 416 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
176. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
178. 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974).
179. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
180. Id. at 829.
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"'manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable
state and federal statutes.' ,,181
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Gissen v. Tackman" 2 a month after Brown v. General Services Administration was handed down and held Brown to be controlling.1 83 In Gissen, a former employee of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development asserted a claim alleging that his
superiors discriminated against him on the basis of his race and
religion in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court, following
Brown, dismissed plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims and held
that Title VII provided the exclusive remedy available to an individual federal employee complaining of job related discrimination. 8 The court quoted from Brown:
The legislative history thus leaves little doubt that Congress was
persuaded that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy. And the case law suggests
that that conclusion was entirely reasonable.
... [T]he relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly
perceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception
of the state of the law was.18 5
In the wake of Brown, most courts have accepted its applicability without analysis. Judge Flannery was the first judge of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to discuss the issue in more than a summary fashion. In Berio v.
EEOC,188 the plaintiff asserted claims under Title VII and the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. She sued her supervisor, a
branch chief, in both his individual and his official capacity, for
alleged discrimination due to her national origin and in retaliation
for her opposition to the defendant's discriminatory practices. The
supervisor's motion to dismiss the allegations against him was
predicated on Brown. The plaintiff sought to distinguish Brown on
the ground that she, unlike Brown, had complied with the jurisdic181. Id. at 833 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974)).
182. 537 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1976). Brown v. G.S.A. was decided June 1, 1976; Gissen on
July 2, 1976.
183. 537 F.2d at 785.
184. Id. at 786.
185. Id. (citing Brown v. G.S.A., 425 U.S. at 828).
186. 446 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1978).
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tional prerequisites of Title VII 187 and that the defendant in this
case was being sued in his individual capacity.1 8 She relied on
Broshnahan v. Eckerd.1 8 9 Judge Flannery found that the procedural posture of the case did not alter the holding of Brown that a
federal employee's Title VII remedy is exclusive and pre-emptive.1 90 With regard to plaintiff's second ground for distinguishing
Brown, the court took exception to the statement in Broshnahan
that "the ability to sue individual defendants for actions that
might constitute federal employment discrimination would not dis1"
rupt the statutory scheme of Title VII
and found that in Brown
the Supreme Court had not distinguished between instances where
federal employees sued federal officials in their official capacity
and those where the officials were sued as individuals. 9 2 The court
relied on the same passage from Brown as that quoted in Gissen.9 3
It opined that, given the scope and specificity of the congressional
scheme and the Supreme Court's holding in Brown, the plaintiff
was precluded from pursuing her claims against her supervisor in
his individual capacity under both the Fifth Amendment and section 1981.94
C.

Davis v. Passman

Davis v. Passman'9 5 is distinguishable from the foregoing line
of cases in that the plaintiff, Ms. Davis, was an employee of Congress and thus was excluded from the protection of Title VII as
amended in 1972.19' Ms. Davis challenged her sex-based dismissal
on Fifth Amendment due process grounds. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that while the Fifth Amendment right to due
process conferred a right upon Davis, the injury she alleged did not
187. Id. at 173.
188. Id.
189. 435 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1977).
190. 446 F. Supp. at 173.
191. Id. at 173.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 173 (quoting Brown v. G.S.A., 425 U.S. at 828, and Gissen v. Tackman, 537
F.2d at 786). See notes 180 & 185 and accompanying text supra.
194. 446 F. Supp. at 174.
195. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
196. In 1972, Congress added section 717 to Title VII, prohibiting discrimination in
most areas of federal employment except Congress itself. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976). See
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1974). See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSmAN, EmPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1066-82 (1976).
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reach the level of the injury inflicted by the unreasonable search in
Bivens.19 7 The court also stated that the Fifth Amendment did not
exist to protect her tenure as a personal aide who served at the will
of Congressman Passman. 9 8 After examining Title VII and the
Civil Service regulations, the court concluded that implying a
cause of action would have the anomalous result of granting noncompetitive service employees a remedy far more extensive than
that enjoyed by employees in the competitive service. It therefore
declined to imply a remedy under the Constitution.199 The court of
appeals expressly rejected Davis' argument because it "would project the penumbra of federal court constitutional due process jurisdiction over every legally cognizable tortious injury" inflicted
under color of federal law. 00
The Supreme Court reversed,2 0 1 holding that a damage rem-

edy could be implied directly under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.2 0 2 The Court found that the exclusion by Congress of its own employees from the protection of Title VII was not
in itself evidence of a congressional intent to foreclose alternate
remedies which might be available to federal employees.2 0 3 Re-

jecting Cort v. Ash,2 0 4 the majority stated that the criteria used in
implying a remedy from the Constitution was different from that
used in implying a statutory cause of action.2 0 5 Relying in part on

Bivens, the Court held that a damage remedy under the Constitution may be appropriate where no other remedies are available and
where Congress has not explicitly foreclosed such a remedy by
statute.208
D. Neely v. Blumenthal
One case which provides a thorough treatment of this issue, in
a case involving an employee covered by Title VII, is Neely v. Blu197.

571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).

198. 571 F.2d at 797-98.
199.

Id.

200. Id. at 799.
201. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
202. Id. at 248-49. The Court expressed no view as to whether the defendant member
of Congress would be protected by the speech or debate clause. Id. at 235 n.11.
203. Id. at 247.
204. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
205.

442 U.S. at 241.

206. Id. at 245-47.
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menthal.2 07 Judge John J. Sirica, in a scholarly decision handed
down July 6, 1978, framed the issue as "whether Brown, in addition to pre-empting non-Title VII employment discrimination
claims brought against federal employers in their official capacities,
also extinguishes ancillary damage claims that are based on Bivens
theories and are directed at federal officers in their individual
capacities. ' 20 8 The court found that while Title VII does not bar
* . .

related damage claims brought against individual officers, no damage action need be implied where Title VII served to vindicate the
same rights sought to be protected by the damage claim.20 9
Neely, a security guard at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing was discharged for cause; the stated reason was repeated acts
of misconduct in the course of employment. The plaintiff had been
a vocal advocate of changing Bureau operations to improve opportunities for predominantly black, lower-grade employees. Neely
contested the adverse action as racially tainted and, in his complaint, alleged infringement of his constitutional right of free
speech. He sought to recover monetary damages from two agency
officers who played a part in his removal. The allegations against
them in their individual capacity were based on a Bivens theory.
The individual defendants moved to dismiss the suit against them
based on Brown v. General Services Administration.210 Judge Sir-

ica reached the same result as did Judge Flannery in Berio v.
EEOC,21 1 but as in Broshnahan,21 2 he held that Brown v. General
Services Administration was distinguishable and not dispositive.
The court suggested that the defendants had read Brown too "expansively" in arguing "that if an employment practice is susceptible to being challenged as discriminatory under Title VII, it can
only be challenged under Title VII and on no other basis regardless of the theory underlying the alternative claim, and irrespective
of the kinds of remedies being sought."213 After concluding that
Brown did not foreclose a Bivens claim, the court decided that a
Bivens action need not be implied.21 4
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

458 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1978).
Id. at 947 (emphasis in original).
Id.
425 U.S. 820 (1976).
446 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1978).
435 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1977).
458 F. Supp. at 949.
Id. at 960.
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In considering Brown v. General Services Administration,the
court recognized that while Title VII affords numerous remedies
for the redress of federal employment discrimination, it does not
permit the recovery of damages.215 The court compared the federal
and private sectors in pointing out that Title VII is not an obstacle
to suits in the private sector based on other anti-discrimination
provisions, but rather is co-extensive with the individual's right to
sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.210 By contrast, in the federal sector, Title VII injunctive remedies are exclusive only because Brown held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 pre-empted all other statutory bases for relief
against the federal government.21 7 The court viewed actions
brought directly against discriminating officials in their individual
capacities as one means by which plaintiffs have challenged the
disparity of remedies,218 but pointed out that such causes of action
generally have been caught up in the pre-emptive sweep of
Brown's exclusivity rule and have been dismissed as redressable
under Title VII 2 19 The court noted that the results reached in
Stith v. Barnwell,220 Dual v. Roudebush221 and Carter v. Marshall22 2 regarding the exclusivity of Title VII "made eminently
223
good sense" but were not controlled by the holding in Brown:

215. Id.
216. Id. at 950. The court cited 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
217. 458 F. Supp. at 950. The pre-empted alternatives include claims based on the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1970); the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970); and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See Brown v. G.S.A., 425 U.S. at 828-29 n.10 (discussion of pre-empted
remedies).
218. 458 F. Supp. at 951 (citing as basis for these actions 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1980)
which prohibits conspiracies to deny equal protection of the law or equal privileges or immunities under the law).
219. 458 F. Supp. at 951.
220. 447 F. Supp. 970 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
221. No. 76-0005 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 9, 1977) (unpublished opinion).
222. 457 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1978).
223. 458 F. Supp. at 952. The court opined that "[t]here is little reason to stretch
marginally applicable statutory, common law and constitutional theories of individual recovery to cover discrimination in federal employment when Title VII furnishes an explicit
method of redress against the federal government,. . . especially ... when consideration is
given to the fact that the broad array of injunctive remedies provided in Title VII are in all
but exceptional cases adequate to make aggrieved parties whole." Id. The court also noted
"that in federal sector employment Title VII prefaces resort to the courts with specific administrative procedures that could be deliberately bypassed if suits for damages against individual officers were sanctioned based on grounds independent of Title VII." Id.
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The reason is that Brown did not address the question of Title
VII's preemptive effect on discrimination suits brought against
individual officers for damages. This point is confirmed by a review of both the facts and the reasoning developed in the Brown
case. A review of the facts in Brown reveals that plaintiff,. . . did
not attempt to redress his claim of discrimination through a damage action directed at the discriminating officials in their individual capacities ....
Brown therefore does not settle the point that
Title VII preempts individual damage actions because the issue
224
was never presented.
Brown was also distinguished because the decision was based on
sovereign immunity. The court pointed out that while this doctrine
protects the federal government from suits which mandate governmental action or deplete public funds, it did not extend to protect
government officers from personal liability arising out of their offi-

cial activities:

25

Sovereign immunity and the various officer immunities offer separate protections that protect separate interests. Research discloses no case that has held that the two kinds of immunities are
integrated in such a way that, if the government consents to suit,
parallel remedies against individual
officers for the same conduct
226
are of necessity extinguished.

The court concluded that "since nothing in Title VII reveals an
intent to disturb the avenues of relief against discriminating offiThese procedures were reviewed by the court. "In addition, it should be noted that if
Title VII claimants were permitted to join Title VII and constitutional tort claims in a
single action, a number of problems would inevitably arise in connection with the processing
of discrimination suits. First, Title VII suits are non-jury matters, while jury demands are
proper in Bivens actions. Thus, to the extent that a complainant's statutory and constitutional actions arise out of the same transactions, permitting joinder of the two kinds of
actions would pose the prospect of converting every Title VII suit into a jury action....
This court's experience with Title VII cases makes clear that Title VII actions are particularly well-suited for disposition by the court because litigants, in the interest of expediting
their cases, frequently will allow the court to consider as evidence all or part of the earlier
developed administrative record. This practice is unlikely if Title VII cases were made jury
matters by the addition of constitutional claims.
"Moreover, Title VII requires that statutorily-based suits be expedited and tried within
120 days, .. while no such requirement applies to constitutional tort actions." Id. at 952
n.10.
Given this, the result might well be that compliance with section 2000e-5(5) will require
the Court to bifurcate the proceedings into two trials with an apparent waste of judicial
resources. Id.
224. Id. at 952 (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 952-53.
226. Id. at 954.
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cials in their personal capacities, Brown's preemption rule stands
circumscribed to the extent of cutting off only official remedies for
federal employment discrimination. ' 227 The court went on to hold
Biuens that justhat there was nothing in the facts or rationale of
2 28
tified implying a remedy under the Constitution:
There must be a persuasive reason for a court to imply a remedy
not authorized by Congress and in this instance, in light of the
availability, and efficacy, of Title VII's comprehensive remedies,
that reason is lacking. Were this a case where plaintiff's first
amendment claims were unrelated to his Title VII claims in the
sense that different conduct was being challenged and different
interests asserted, a different result might well obtain.... Such,
however, is not the case here. Where, as in this case, plaintiff's
first amendment claim challenges conduct outlawed by Title VII
and attempts to vindicate rights of expression also protected by
the statute, and where, as here, Title VI's remedial measures
promise to be effective in redressing the asserted wrongs, there is
simply no sound reason for treating the claims separately by2 im29
plying a damage cause of action not authorized by Congress.
In support of that holding, the court analyzed Bivens and distinguished factors on which the Supreme Court had relied in that
case from those present in Neely. Unlike the situation which confronted Bivens, Neely would not be relegated to pursuing claims
based on hostile state law theories: 3 0 His rights were protected by
Title VII, which provides an adequate remedy for vindicating First
Amendment interests,23 1 there was no necessity for implying a
damage remedy in the sense that a "damage or nothing" situation
was presented,23 2 and Title VII's full range of remedies was well
suited for making Neely whole.23 3 The court also suggested that,
unlike Bivens and Dellums v. Powell,2 " Neely did not present violations of "basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and
classic form. ' 23 5 The court noted that the plaintiff could obtain an
227. Id. at 954-55 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 960 (emphasis in original).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 956.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 957.
233. Id.
234. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
235. 458 F. Supp. at 959 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)
quoted in Dellums v. Powell, 566 F. Supp. at 194-95). The court refers to these "core constitutional protections" in Neely. 458 F. Supp. at 960.
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injunction, reinstatement and back pay from the government, as
appropriate, and that "plaintiff has [no] right to insist that his recovery come out of the pocketbooks
of his superiors rather than
' 23 6
out of government funds.
The court also pointed out that "the implication of damage
liability in the absence of legislative direction involves a determi'237
nation that is based largely on discretionary considerations.
One such important consideration, identified in Bivens, was
"whether compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'appropriate' to the
vindication of the interest asserted. ' 238 The court found that such
relief was neither necessary nor appropriate.3 9
Economou and Davis rest on the irrefutable notion that federal officials are subject to the restraints imposed by the Federal
Constitution. Nonetheless, the approach of Neely in refusing to
imply a remedy is sound.
Regarding the basis for suits brought under the Constitution
against individuals, Bivens actions had been recognized by every
court of appeals when the Supreme Court accepted the constitutional tort doctrine in Economou. Economou establishes that only
certain officials may interpose an immunity defense on motion for
summary judgment or motion to dismiss; all other officials must
establish a valid qualified-immunity defense in the course of a trial
on the merits. Neely raises substantial questions concerning
whether the distinction drawn in Economou between types of officials is an issue which need be reached in Title VII cases. Judge
Sirica would simply decline to imply a remedy by recognizing that
Title VII remedies were adequate.
The court also points out that plaintiffs have no right to demand relief from the individual employee's pocketbook. This is
certainly consistent with concerns of Congress, made evident as it
considered amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which
would remove the possibility of liability for a civil judgment resulting from the way a government employee performs his job.2 40
Neely clearly defines several factors which are likely to govern
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 957.
Id. at 959.
Id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 407).
458 F. Supp. at 960.
See notes 356-63 and accompanying text infra.
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future constitutional tort litigation brought in conjunction with, or

in lieu of, Title VII suits. Prior to Neely a number of federal courts
had decided not to imply a cause of action, reasoning that Brown
v. General Services Administration precluded it. Neely and Davis
are persuasive authority for the point that, in appropriate cases,
such a remedy would be permissible. If the reasoning of the court
in Neely is accepted, the practical effect of the case will be that
Title VII constitutional tort suits against federal officials will be
barred for reasons suggested by Bivens rather than Brown in cases
where the plaintiff is protected by Title VII.2 4 1 It seems clear that

Bivens and Economou, neither of which are Title VII cases, must
be examined and applied to any case to which Title VII pertains
when allegations of Fifth Amendment violations are made against
officials in their individual capacities. Further, those who do not
now enjoy Title VII protection will be able to obtain redress for
discriminatory conduct by bringing a Bivens-Economou suit
against the offending officials personally, as in Davis v. Passman.
These changes constitute a substantial departure from prior practice in the federal courts.
IV.

The Doctrine of Immunity

Absolute immunity for officials of the executive branch of the
federal government was first established in Spalding v. Vilas24 2 by

the Supreme Court in 1896. The Court reasoned in Spalding that
federal officials should be entitled to perform their assigned duties
without being subjected to damage suits based on their conduct.
The Court expressed the rationale for the immunity defense as
follows: '
In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive
Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should
not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his
official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in
a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he
241. See Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1978).
242. 161 U.S. 483 (1896). The immunity doctrine for federal executive officials began
as a means of protecting them in the execution of their federal statutory duties from criminal or civil actions based on state law. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 856-66 (1824).
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A conditional immunity was extended to federal officials of
lower rank in Barr v. Matteo.244 The immunity granted in Barr
applies only to actions having a policymaking or judgmental element, and immunity from liability exists only for the exercise of
"discretionary," not "ministerial," functions. Barr also requires
that the allegedly wrongful acts be "within the outer perimeter of
the official's duties. '245 The Court recognized that a federal official
must be able to perform his duties fully and without hesitation:
It has been thought important that officials of government should
be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which would consume time and energies which would
otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of
which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
and effec24 6
tive administration of policies of government.
The Court sought to reconcile its policy of protecting individual
citizens "from pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious
action on the part of officials of the Federal Government" 247 with
that of protecting "the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against the harassment and inevitable hazards
of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits. '248
In refining the immunity doctrine, the Court recognized that
instances of injustice or seemingly harsh application of the rule
may occur, but deferred to the advice of Judge Learned Hand:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for
243. 161 U.S. at 498-99.
244. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
245. Id. at 571; see Owen v. City of Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1121 (W.D. Mo.
1976), aff'd, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (discussion of good faith
defense). For a discussion of scope of duty, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 573; Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1345 (2d Cir. 1972); Ove Gustafsson Contracting
Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962); Gregoire v. Biddle, 171 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949).
246. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the
rationale was restated once again: "(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith,
of subjecting to liability an officer who is required by the legal obligation of his position, to
exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good." Id. at 240.
247. 360 U.S. at 565.
248. Id.
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any other personal motive not connected with the public good,
should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if
it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the
guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification
for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is
well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial
and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in
the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the
public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded
on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must
indeed be means of punishing public offenders who have been
truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone
who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the
answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in
either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant
249
dread of retaliation.
In Barr, the Court noted that the degree of immunity need not
be the same for all officials or for all purposes. 25 0 Some officials
require a full exemption from liability because of the nature of
their duties. Such is the case in section 1983 actions against
judges2 51 and state prosecutors.2 52 Police, however, have been afforded a more limited protection, 2 3 and the degree of their immunity has been tied to their scope of authority. 25 4 Other officials who
enjoy only a qualified immunity include prison officials and of249. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), quoted with approval in
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571.
250. 360 U.S. at 573. See also Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1950).
251. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335 (1872). Cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 447 U.S. 934 (1980) (private individuals who bribe
judge are not shielded by judge's absolute immunity).
252. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Cf. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193
(1979) (defense attorneys appointed by federal court do not enjoy federally created
immunity).
253. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

254.

Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
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ficers,2 55 state hospital superintendents,2 56 and local school board
2 57
members.

By contrast, municipal employees have seen their immunity
abrogated by recent decisions of the Court. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 258 the Supreme Court overruled, in part,
Monroe v. Pape259 and held that local governing bodies and local
officials can be sued directly under section 1983 for monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief.260 The Court, however, reserved
judgment on the issue of the scope of official immunity available to
municipalities sued under section 1983.281

That issue was squarely addressed by the Court in Owen v.
City of Independence. 62 There the Court held that "municipalities have no immunity from damages liability flowing from their
''
constitutional violations . . . under section 1983. 26S
In Economou, the Supreme Court rejected the government's
contention that the defendant executive branch officials were absolutely immune from liability for damagesI' 4 and held that there
could be no absolute immunity for violations of the Federal Constitution.265 In its analysis, the Court looked back to the earliest
immunity cases, in which federal officials who acted outside their
statutory authority had been held liable for their acts, and were
protected only if their actions were authorized by controlling federal law. 266 The Court concluded that an unconstitutional act, even

if authorized by statute, was nonetheless viewed as unauthorized
"in contemplation of law," and thus there could be no immunity
255. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
256. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
257. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
258. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
259. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
260. 436 U.S. at 663.
261. Id. at 701.
262. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
263. Id. at 657.
264. The government had argued that the defendants were absolutely immune, and
that such immunity would be a valid defense even if they had infringed on citizens' constitutional rights in the course of enforcing the law, and even if the violations were knowing
and deliberate.
265. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
266. Id. at 490-91 (citing Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 19 (1896); Cunningham v.
Macon & B.R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452 (1883); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 157 (1804).
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defense.286 The Court distinguished the Spalding v. Vilas line of
cases, pointing out that they did not purport to immunize officials
who ignored limitations imposed on their authority.2 6 8 It suggested
that Spalding implies that an official who fails to observe obvious
statutory or constitutional limitations on his powers should not be
excused from liability. 6 9 In reference to Barr v. Matteo, the Court

said:
[W]e are confident that Barr did not purport to protect an official
who has not only committed a wrong under local law, but also
violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the
Constitution. Whatever level of protection from state interference
is appropriate for federal officials executing their duties under
federal law, it cannot be doubted that these officials, even when
acting pursuant to congressional authorization, are subject to the
restraints imposed by the Federal Constitution.
The liability of officials who have exceeded constitutional
limits was not confronted in either Barr or Spalding.
Neither of
270
those cases supports the Government's position.
Footnote 22 makes clear that the Court was considering only constitutional torts, thus preserving, at least for the present, the vital21
ity of Barr v. Matteo immunity in suits for common-law torts. 7
In reaching its holding, the Court addressed certain situations
wherein constitutional rights are more likely to be abused, referring specifically to "such important personal interests as liberty,
property, and free speech. 2 7 2 The majority noted that "an action
for damages against the responsible official can 7 be
an important
3
means of vindicating constitutional guarantees.

'2

Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all
individuals, whatever their position in government, are subject to
federal law:
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.
No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.
All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest,
are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.". . . In light
267.

438 U.S. at 490-91 (citing Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 285-92 (1885);

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218-223 (1882)).
268. Id. at 492-93.
269. Id. at 493-94.
270. Id. at 495.
271. Id. at 495 n.22.
272. Id. at 505.
273. Id. at 506.
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of this principle, federal officials who seek absolute exemption
from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the
burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of
2 4
that scope. 7
The Court specifically recognized that "in a suit for damages arising from unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion are entitled only to the qualified immunity specified
in Scheuer, subject to those exceptional situations where it is
demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct
of the public business. "275
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,2 76 the Supreme Court considered the
question of a state official's immunity for "the purposes of 42
U.S.C. § 1983,1's 77 a context which the Court was careful to distinguish from that of federal officials in Barr v. Matteo.7 8 Scheuer
therefore had no impact on the rule of Barr v. Matteo; the Court
in Scheuer held that state officials are only entitled to the protection of a qualified immunity:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of
the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office
and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time
of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time
and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive of9
ficers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.27
This was as far as the Court in Scheuer was willing to go. It reasoned that if it were to hold state officials absolutely immune from
suit under section 1983, the statute "would be drained of
' 280
meaning.
Prior to Butz v. Economou, it could have been successfully argued that federal officials were absolutely immune from suit under
274. Id. (citation omitted).
275.

Id. at 507.

276. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). This is perhaps the most significant case leading to Butz v.
Economou and the erosion, sub silento, of the immunity doctrine. The holding of this case
was expressly limited to consideration of immunity of state officials in the context of a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 suit.
277.

416 U.S. at 243.

278. Id. at 247.
279, Id. at 247-48.
280. Id. at 248.
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Barr v. Matteo and Spalding v. Vilas because Congress had not
created a cause of action against federal officials as it had done
against state officials in section 1983. In considering the immunity
of federal officials, the Supreme Court looked to lower court Bivens-type cases 81 and found that "with impressive unanimity, the
federal courts of appeals have concluded that federal officials
should receive no greater degree of protection from constitutional
claims than their counterparts in state government.

2 82

This notion

was recognized by the Second Circuit when it considered Economou. The Second Circuit held that "it would be 'incongruous and
confusing, to say the least, to develop different standards of immunity for state officials sued under § 1983 and federal officers sued
on similar grounds under causes of action founded directly on the
Constitution.' ,28s The Supreme Court looked to the reasoning of

the Ninth Circuit and to similar conclusions of other courts concerning the disparate immunity accorded state and federal officials:
[Defendants] offer no significant reason for distinguishing, as far
as the immunity doctrine is concerned, between litigation under
§ 1983 against state officers and actions against federal officers
alleging violation of constitutional rights under the general federal question statute. In contrast, the practical advantage of having just one federal immunity doctrine for suits arising under federal law is self-evident. Further, the rights at stake in a suit
brought directly under the Bill of Rights are no less worthy of full
protection than the constitutional and statutory rights protected
by § 1983.284

The Court went on to agree with the conclusions reached by other
courts that,
in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is
no basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional infringement as
281. In Bivens, the Supreme Court reserved the question of whether government officials were immune from liability by virtue of their position. The Second Circuit held that
qualified immunity sufficiently protected federal law enforcement officers in that case. See
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 486. For a more comprehensive analysis of cases, see Lehmann, supra note 15.
282. 438 U.S. at 498 (emphasis in original).
283. Id. at 499 (quoting Economou v. United States Dep't of Agric., 535 F.2d 688 (2d
Cir. 1976) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346-47 (2d Cir.
1972)).
284. 438 U.S. at 499-500 (emphasis in original)(quoting Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376,
1380 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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authorized by Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued
for the identical violation under § 1983. . . .Surely, federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate
federal constitutional rules than do state officers. 285
The Court in Scheuer concluded that section 1983 "would be
drained of meaning" if state officials were permitted to interpose
an absolute-immunity defense. 286 This rationale had first been recognized in Bivens, which applied only to Fourth Amendment violations by federal police officials. Although the Court had been careful to distinguish immunity for state officials from that of federal
officials when it considered Scheuer v. Rhodes, it rejected that distinction when it was proffered by the government in Butz v. Economou. Rather, the Court developed a circular rationale: "[T]he
cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents would similarly be 'drained of meaning' if federal officials
were entitled to absolute immunity for their consitutional transgressions. ' ' 11 To base its holding in Economou on its decision in
Bivens is to overrule by implication the distinction between state
and federal officials which the Court had previously been careful to
preserve, and which was clearly recognized by Congress. Further,
the foundation of the Economou decision is rooted in the section
1983 anomaly addressed in Bivens, which was created by congressional action for state officials and congressional inaction for federal officials. 8 8
V.

The Application of Butz v. Economou

As stated earlier, Scheuer v. Rhodes involved a suit brought
against state officials under section 1983. Prior to Economou, the
Supreme Court had scrupulously distinguished the Scheuer line of
cases as inapplicable to immunity questions for federal officials.28 9
The holding in Economou clearly applies Scheuer v. Rhodes and
285.
286.
287.

438 U.S. at 500-01 (emphasis in original).
416 U.S. at 248.
438 U.S. at 501 (citation omitted).

288. Had Congress intended that such suits could be brought, provision could easily
have been made in 42 U.S.C.

The rationale of the Court is weak unless the ruling in

Scheuer is expanded or Barr is overruled.
In Bivens, the Court was concerned with draining § 1983 of meaning. In Economou, the

Court expressed its fear that Bivens would be drained of meaning but, in so concluding,
does not discuss the rule of Scheuer.
289.

416 U.S. at 243.
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other section 1983 cases to suits brought against federal officials
under the Federal Constitution, unless absolute immunity is
deemed essential for the conduct of public business.
Subsequent to Bivens, numerous lower federal courts have decided cases involving alleged constitutional torts. A substantial
body of case law has developed regarding the procedural and substantive aspects involved in litigation of this type. Issues involving
the statute of limitations, amount-in-controversy, standards for
judging the sufficiency of pleadings, injunctive relief, the doctrine
of respondeat superior, the extension of Bivens to other constitutional provisions, and problems of good faith and scope of duty
have been developed elsewhere and will not be dealt with here."'
Each of these issues is controversial and problematic, however, and
differences naturally exist in the manner in which the various circuits resolve them. In Economou, the Supreme Court discussed
broad policy considerations but failed to explain with care or precision the principles which are to govern litigation against federal
officials. Some of these issues will be resolved by applying case law
developed in section 1983 litigation. Many will be resolved of necessity on a case-by-case basis. In many instances, different rules
will prevail among the circuits. 91 A careful reading of Scheuer v.
Rhodes in conjunction with Butz v. Economou reveals several fundamental principles that will control emerging constitutional tort
litigation.
The qualified immunity established in Scheuer v. Rhodes is
controlling in federal constitutional tort suits. Although the Supreme Court had provided a definition of qualified immunity in
Scheuer,2 9 2 the impact of the substitution of qualified immunity
for absolute immunity was noted by the dissent in Economou:
Putting to one side the illogic and impracticability of distinguishing between constitutional and common-law claims for purposes
of immunity, which will be discussed shortly, this sort of immu290. See Lehmann, supra note 15, at 544-92.
291. This problem was also recognized by Justice Stevens, dissenting in Procunier V.
Navarette: "I have no quarrel with the extension of a qualified immunity defense to all state
agents. A public servant who is conscientiously doing his job to the best of his ability should
rarely, if ever, be exposed to the risk of damage liability. But when the Court makes the
qualified immunity available to all potential defendants, it is especially important that the
contours of this affirmative defense be explained with care and precision." 434 U.S. 555, 569
(1978).
292. See note 279 and accompanying text supra;Lehmann, supra note 15, at 587-91.
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nity analysis badly misses the mark. It amounts to saying that an
official has immunity until someone alleges he has acted unconstitutionally. But that is no immunity at all: The "immunity" disap2 93
pears at the very moment when it is needed.
The dissent went on to explain that the critical inquiry in applying
immunity should not turn on whether or not a constitutional tort
was committed.2 9 4 The critical inquiry focuses on whether the action was taken in the discharge of official duties.29
In Bivens, the Second Circuit established a simple test for determining whether an official commits an actionable constitutional
tort. Under Bivens, no actionable wrong exists either if the official's act was within the scope of his duties as an official traditionally granted immunity or if the function involved a discretionary
act. If the official cannot establish that he qualifies under either
the "scope of duties" or "discretionary act" standards (which
would qualify him for absolute immunity), the official may still
avoid liability by proving both that actions were taken in a goodfaith belief that the conduct was lawful and that this belief was
reasonable. 2 6 Economou eliminates the possibility of a dismissal
based upon simple affidavits establishing a "scope of duties" or
"discretionary act" defense. Rather, as a general rule, federal officials must now defend on the merits by proving their good faith
and reasonable belief. 29 7 It is this result which is criticized by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent.2 9 8
Barr v. Matteo controls in suits for common-law torts which
are not brought directly under the Constitution, and federal officials will, as before, be held absolutely immune for acts within the
"outer perimeter of their duties. '299 The Court reasoned that an
immunity defense is inapplicable to unconstitutional acts, however. 300 Thus, Barr's immunity doctrine applies to tortious but not
constitutional conduct, while the Economou qualified-immunity
rule applies only where a constitutional tort is alleged.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
F.2d 289,
298.
299.
300.

438 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1342-48 (2d Cir. 1972).
See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566
292 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(en banc).
438 U.S. at 518-23.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490-91, 495 n.22.
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In Evans v. Wright,"' 1 a case considered after Butz v. Economou, employees of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare were sued for tortious interference with the contractual relations of a medical-equipment supplier. The Fifth Circuit
considered the applicability of Economou but applied Barr v. Matteo and held that where a suit is for ordinary tort claims, the official immunity doctrine continues to apply.3 0 2
As stated in the introduction, the common-law constitutional
tort distinction is at least a semi-hollow one. Many common-law
torts have constitutional tort analogs that can be asserted to pierce
the shield of immunity and proceed through discovery to trial on
the merits. Judge Merritt's dissent in Granger v. Marek,303 another
case decided after Economou, cuts to the heart of the difficulty
raised by the common-law constitutional tort distinction:
Though the Court's holding in Economou is clearly limited to
constitutional claims as distinguished from state tort claims, the
reasoning of the opinion leads me to the conclusion that the
choice between absolute immunity and qualified immunity for
public officers should turn on the role and function of the official
and not on whether the alleged wrong sounds in tort or under the
Constitution. When framing a complaint against a public officer,
an assault, a trespass, a false imprisonment or false arrest, a libel,
as well as various invasions of privacy and interferences with contractual relationships, can be characterized just as easily as a constitutional wrong as a tort. Making immunity turn on a distinction between common law torts and constitutional wrongs simply
encourages pleaders to wrap familiar common law concepts in a
new vernacular of constitutional deprivation. 3 04
In Economou, the Supreme Court established the proposition that
"[i]nsubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal
courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should not survive a motion to dismiss."3 0 5 Similarly,

the Court stated that firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by friv301.
302.
303.
304.

582 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 21.
583 F.2d 781, 786 (6th Cir. 1978).
Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).

305. 438 U.S. at 507-08.
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olous lawsuits." ' This seems to imply that the Court intended
that constitutional tort cases be scrutinized by wary federal courts
and that constitutional remedies not be implied in most cases.
Notwithstanding the admonitions of the Supreme Court, however,
at least one court that has considered the immunity of federal officials since Butz has raised the existence of a constitutional cause of
action sua sponte107 When the Court's language in Economou is
compared with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the law
developed thereunder, the likelihood of an evolving restrictive
standard seems remote. For example, in the context of Rule
12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed if it is obviously without merit
or is wholly frivolous.30 8 A similar test must be overcome by an
official who seeks summary judgment. Under Rule 56,
[t]he movant ... must carry the burden of demonstrating the

absence of any genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
party opposing the motion is entitled to all favorable inferences
deducible from the parties' evidentiary representations. The
court's function is not to resolve any such issue, but only to ascertain whether any exists, and all doubts in that regard must be
resolved against summary judgment.309
These rules appear to contradict the Court's assurance in Economou that many constitutional tort allegations will be disposed of
on the pleadings.310
In an apparent effort to create a loophole through which lower
courts may confer absolute immunity in exceptional cases, the Supreme Court enunciated an exception to the general rule of Economou. Absolute immunity will continue to be a viable defense in
those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that such immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business." " Two
post-Bivens cases illustrate how this exception might be applied.
In Tigue v. Swaim,

12

a military officer sued his commander,

306. Id. at 508.
307. Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 1978).
308. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1974).
309. Bouchard v. Washington, 514 F.2d 824, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
310. See also Tabaclera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968) (holding that on motion for summary judgment
facts will be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party); Payne v. District of
Columbia, 559 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing the standard for determining whether
constitutional claims are made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction).
311. 438 U.S. at 507.
312. 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978).
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accusing the superior officer of libel and false imprisonment. The
district court applied the Barr v. Matteo doctrine of absolute immunity since common-law torts were alleged. 1s The Eighth Circuit
adopted the commander's assertion that federal officials sued for
common-law torts such as false imprisonment and libel are entitled
to absolute immunity,3 1 ' but found that the complaint alleged facts
sufficient to establish unlawful deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. 1 5 On its own motion, the Court concluded that the
complaint was not limited to common-law violations, but that it
also embodied constitutional allegations.3 16 The court then applied
Economou:
In our view, we have no other alternative under Butz v. Economou than to hold that military officers during peacetime are not
automatically clothed with absolute immunity in every situation.
Butz demands a particularized inquiry into the functions an official performs and the circumstances under which they are performed prior to the granting of absolute immunity ....
Whether
they are so entitled depends on an analysis of the functions they
perform, their immunity117 under common law and the interests
3
sought to be protected.
The court took notice of the parties' duties, which included dealing
with nuclear weapons and the national security interests involved,
and found that the commander was engaged in a special function
3 18
entitling him to absolute immunity.
In Granger v. Marek,3 11 originally a state court action, a tax
preparer alleged the common law tort of intentional infliction of
mental and physical distress against several agents of the Internal
Revenue Service. The case was removed to federal court under Title 28 of the United States Code, section 1442(a)(1). The complaint
alleged that the agents sought out plaintiff's clients and advised
them (1) that they would be audited solely for doing business with
plaintiff; (2) that plaintiff's competitors charged less and should be
employed instead of the plaintiff; and (3) that the plaintiff was
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
U.S. 961
319.

Id. at 910.
Id. at 914.
Id. at 913.
Id.
Id. at 913-14.
Id. at 914. Cf. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441
(1980); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
583 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1978).
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suspected of criminal activity. The agents allegedly had threatened
to put the plaintiff out of business. The district court held that the
agents were immune from suit because they had acted within the
scope of their official duties as federal officers.3 20 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed.

21

The court considered Butz v. Economou

and analyzed the case under criteria that Economou had held applicable previously only in suits brought directly under the Constitution. Rather than following Barr v. Matteo, the court relied on
Scheuer v. Rhodes but defined the scope of immunity in accordance with guidelines established in Economou.32 2 The court
quoted, and explicitly approved, the district court's finding that
agents of the Internal Revenue Service were government officials
entitled to immunity. "The implicit nature of the duties performed
by the . . . investigatory agents of the IRS makes them particu-

larly susceptible to suit by those who may be investigated. Tax collectors, and those who assist them, have never been the objects of
over-affection by the American Public. '3 23 Both courts concluded
that these agents, by virtue of their duties, are in a class that
should be afforded the same absolute immunity as that extended
to judges and prosecutors. The courts did not explore whether the
agents had acted in good faith.2 4
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not specify criteria for
testing the qualification, "essential to the public business.

3

25

In

light of the principle cases cited in Economou,3 26 however, several
considerations applicable to many federal officials, including personnel managers, may bring such officials within this exception: (1)
qualified immunity invariably leads to suits which would consume
time and energies that would otherwise be devoted to government
service;3 27 (2) permitting suit would undermine agency administra320. Id. at 782.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 783-84.

323. Id. at 784.
324. The district court considered scope of authority, but did not discuss good faith.

The court of appeals did not rely on the Scheuer tests. Id. at 784-85. Cf. Dema v. Feddor,
470 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
325. See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 209-10 n.14 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).
326. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

327. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571-76; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. at 498;
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 517-30 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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tive processes and procedures of the Civil Service Reform Act, or a
similar statutory or regulatory scheme; 2 8 (3) established remedies
short of litigation are less deleterious to morale and discipline
among federal employees; (4) the government employee plaintiff is
distinguishable from the private citizen plaintiff in the context of
constitutional litigation; 2s (5) supervisors must be free to exercise
discretion and independent judgment in managing agency affairs;330 (6) supervisors who take adverse action against an employee may be likened to prosecutors; 31 (7) many rights are already fully protected by internal agency review and appeals to the
Civil Service Commission;3s 2 (8) the courtroom may be a less effective means to test employer misconduct if others are available; 3
(9) qualified immunity would unduly inhibit established and effective personnel management mechanisms and would impair the
manager's ability to deal with employees with necessary candor
and decisiveness and would have a chilling effect on the exercise of
crucial managerial prerogatives; and (10) the rights asserted by the
employee are circumscribed by management necessities and the
imperative of maintaining an orderly and efficient public
part).
328. "See, e.g., Citizens Savings v. Califano, 480 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1979); Neely v.
Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1978). As a general rule, statutory remedies will be
held exclusive. See Brown v. G.S.A., 425 U.S. 820 (1976); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S.
149 (1966).
329. This principle has been judicially recognized. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (balancing public employee's right to free speech against the
employer's need to promote the efficiency of the service, recognizing that a teacher's status
as employee was distinguishable from that of a citizen and that the interests of an employer
dealing with its employee differ significantly from its interests in regard to the population in
general). Reasonable restrictions on an employee's partisan political activity have been upheld. See the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7321 (1976). See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973) (upholding state restrictions on political activity); Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947). Regarding restriction of political affiliations by the government, see Law
Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
330. See note 327 supra.
331. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 509-10.
332. Where an adequate remedy exists, the rationale of Bivens does not apply. See
note 328 supra. See also Lehmann, supra note 15, at 566-72.
333. The national labor policy has long favored arbitration of disputes as a means of
settlement preferable to litigation because of the expertise of the arbitrator to whom considerable deference is given by the courts. See The Steelworkers Trilogy of 1960, 363 U.S. 564,
574, 593 (1960).
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administration. 4
Economou further instructed that" 'special factors counselling
hesitation'" are to be considered in determining the appropriate
level of immunity in each case. 335 The Court restated the "special
factors" which were considered in Bivens: the presence or absence
of congressional authorization for suits against federal officials, the
absence of affirmative action by Congress, the type of injury sustained and whether it is normally compensable in damages, and
the types of questions raised by the plaintiff's claim and the
court's ability to handle them.336 The Court stated that "exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity
is essential for the conduct of the public business" is so important
that it might also be considered a "special factor counselling hesitation. 3 3 7 In discussing the "exceptional situation," the Court

seems to be establishing a threshold issue to be considered in each
case, in effect whether a constitutional tort remedy should be implied at all, or whether the issue should be permitted to survive a
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.
Bivens is'the seminal case dealing with implication of a damage remedy directly from the Constitution. In Bivens, the Court
found that the plaintiff's remedies at state law were inadequate
and implied a remedy against the government agents because the
case involved "no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.

'338

Justice Harlan empha-

sized the necessity of this result in his concurring opinion:
[I]t is apparent that some form of damages is the only possible
remedy for someone in Bivens' position. It will be a rare case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position will be able to
obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any court.
However desirable a direct remedy against the Government might
be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sovereign
still remains immune to suit. Finally, assuming Bivens' innocence
of the crime charged, the "exclusionary rule" is simply irrelevant.
For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.3 39
The question, as articulated by Justice Harlan, is "whether com334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1978).
438 U.S. at 503 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 396).
438 U.S. at 503.
Id. at 507.
403 U.S. at 396.
Id. at 409-10.
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pensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'appropriate' to the vindication of
the interest asserted. '' s40 In appropriate cases involving federal employees, the basis for implying a constitutional cause of action may
be challenged when independent rights and remedies exist under
law or agency regulations.3 " Where a full range of remedies is provided, federal employees are not relegated to pursuing claims
based on hostile state law theories. Unlike Bivens, the "damages or
nothing" situations will not occur where other remedies are avail-

able. Such a conclusion was reached in3 42Neely v. Blumenthal, discussed earlier in the Title VII context.
When a supplemental damage remedy arising directly under
the Constitution is sought, the federal courts will generally proceed
with caution, carefully assessing the existing remedies, considering
any congressional determinations which suggest that a supplemental remedy should not be available, determining whether a judicially created remedy would be inconsistent with an act of Congress, 3"4 and looking to find other remedies which adequately
protect the constitutional right in question. When no other remedy exists, however, the case for implying a Bivens remedy becomes most compelling."
Finally, the Supreme Court reiterated that the special functions required of some executive officials justify exceptions to the
general rule of qualified immunity. Judges acting in the exercise of
their judicial functions; 34 6 federal prosecutors, advocates, jurors
and witnesses in judicial proceedings; 47 federal hearing examiners
or administrative law judges performing adjudicatory functions
340. Id. at 407.
341. See, e.g., The Civil Service Reform Act and the regulations thereunder, Title VII,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal Employment Opportunities
Act, suprd notes 29-33.
342. See notes 207-41 and accompanying text supra.
343. The Court in Bivens attempted to limit its holding to those situations where Congress had failed to express a contrary intention. 403 U.S. at 397. If a statutory remedy exists, courts will not imply a constitutional one so as to defeat the purpose and intent of the
statute. McLaughlin v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 885, 893 n.4 (S.D. Ala. 1974) (relating to
discrimination in federal employment and holding Title VII exclusive).
344. Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977).
345. "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) quoted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
at 397. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
346. 438 U.S. at 508-09.
347. Id. at 509-10.
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within a federal agency; 1 and agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor, are all entitled to a claim
of absolute immunity under Economou.34 9
VI.

The Future of Economou Actions

The extent to which personnel managers will be held liable for
constitutional torts committed against their subordinates in the
day-to-day administration of personnel matters is unclear. It is
doubtful that the courts will place personnel managers within the
class of officials who perform "special functions" justifying application of the absolute-immunity rule. Courts may conclude, however,
that managing the affairs and supervising the conduct of
subordinate federal employees presents an "exceptional situation"
where absolute immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public
business." The better view might be simply to decline to imply a
constitutional remedy, thereby limiting federal employees to remedies created by Congress, the Office of Personnel Management, or
the employing agency. In the alternative, managers will be forced
to defend suits brought against them in their personal capacity.
Where this situation has occurred, it has not gone uncriticized.38 0
In Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises,Inc. v. Smithsonian Institution, 51 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia criticized the Second Circuit opinion in Economou. This
was, of course, before the Supreme Court affirmed the Economou
holding that federal officials were entitled only to the same qualified immunity applicable to state officials sued pursuant to section
1983. Judge Wilkey, concurring dubitante, expressed serious
doubts about the validity of Barr v. Matteo but left it to the Supreme Court to alter the rule of that case.152 He went on to set
forth his own reasons for concluding that the lower court's decision
in Butz v. Economou expressed an unwise rule of law: "[I]f the
balance struck by Barr is deemed unsatisfactory, then the response
should be legislative-the waiver of sovereign immunity for inten348. Id. at 511-13.
349. Id. at 515.
350. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Expeditions
Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 293, 300-05 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
351. 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
352. Id. at 305.
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tional torts." 5 ' Serious questions exist, however, about Congress'
power with respect to constitutional remedies, since the first eight
amendments contain no clause granting to Congress the power to
implement their substantive provisions by appropriate legislation._54 In view of the Supreme Court's recognition in both Bivens
and Economou that the result reached in each of those cases would
have been different had Congress acted to create an adequate remedy, such congressional action would most likely be upheld.
The early immunity cases established goals that can only be
fully realized in the future if Congress acts. The Court could have
applied section 1983 to federal officials, but had Congress intended
that such suits be brought, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1871355 could have been amended. However wise the result of
Economou may be in view of the passage of time and changes in
the scope of governmental affairs and the involvement of the federal government in the lives of Americans, unless the Court is willing to overrule Barr v. Matteo, a policy change of this type might
better have been left to Congress. If the fact that no person is
above the Constitution is indeed a significant aspect of Economou,
it becomes more difficult to rationalize a different scope of immunity for those who commit common-law torts which have constitutional-law analogs. A legislative response should be encouraged.
Several amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act,3 56 which
would have resolved some current immunity issues, were considered during the 95th and 96th Congresses. One such amendment
was Senate Bill 2117, -' 5 drafted by the Attorney General and actively supported by him in congressional hearings. The Attorney
General's primary concern grew out of the increasing cost and the
difficulties associated with the retention of private attorneys by the
58
Justice Department to represent government employees.
353. Id. at 306.
354. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv.
L. RE V. 1532, 1546 (1972). But see Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (holding that the
Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized in the common law).
355. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976).
356. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2410-2412, 2671-2680 (1976).
357. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 15,284 (1977).
358. Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Joint Hearing on S. 2117 Before
the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights & Remedies and the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice& Procedureof the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
7 (1978); see also Staff Report to the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice& Procedure of
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Senate Bill 2117 would have redefined the relationship between federal employees, their supervisors and private citizens by
removing the onus of personal liability currently on governmental
officials acting in the line of duty. The Attorney General set forth
the three basic purposes of Senate Bill 2117:
First, to provide the victims of common law and "constitutional
torts" committed by federal employees with a remedy against a
financially responsible defendant; second, to protect federal employees from suits for money damages arising out of the performance of their duties; and, third, to eliminate the need for the Department of Justice to hire private attorneys to represent
individual federal employees against whom such suits might be
brought. The proposed bill would achieve these purposes by expanding the bases upon which the United States can be held liable for the conduct of its employees under the Tort Claims Act
the government the exclusive civil
and by making suits 3against
39
remedy in such cases.

Although Senate Bill 2117 provided for an exclusive remedy
against the United States in suits based upon acts by federal employees, thus, in effect, granting an absolute statutory immunity
from civil suit, it provided for appropriate disciplinary action
where an employee's conduct resulted in the payment of damages
by the government.
While Senate Bill 2117 was not enacted, it has been modified
and reintroduced in various forms.36 0 The 96th Congress considered two bills, successors to Senate Bill 2117, which would substantially clarify some of the uncertainty surrounding the issue of federal employee immunity. Senate Bill 695861 and House Resolution
2659"62 would have amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to make
the United States the exclusive party against whom civil suit could
be brought in cases involving torts allegedly committed by federal
employees. They would have permitted only the government to be
liable for common law torts committed by employees "within the
scope of their employment" and for constitutional torts committed
either "within the scope of" or "under color of" federal employthe Comm. on the Judiciary, Justice Department Retention of Private Counsel to Represent Federal Employees in Civil Lawsuits, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
359. Id. at 26 (letter of Attorney General to Vice President Mondale (Sept. 16, 1977)).
360. See, e.g., S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 11,048 (1978).
361. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S. 2919-23 (1979).
362. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H 1101 (1979).
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ment.3 61 Those bills were not enacted and died at the close of the
96th Congress.36 4
The Attorney General's position in seeking to amend the Federal Tort Claims Act found support in Neely v. Blumenthal,
wherein Judge Sirica noted that a "plaintiff has no right to insist
that his recovery come out of the pocketbooks of his superiors
rather than out of governmental funds."36 5 As Justice Harlan recognized, the real question of concern to potential plaintiffs ought
to be whether relief is "necessary
or appropriate" to the vindica3 66
tion of the asserted right.
Suits brought against government employees, or against employees and the government jointly, pose difficulties of considerable magnitude. Decisions of personnel managers constantly affect
employees; similarly, citizens have reason to demand vindication
when the government has wronged them. The rule of Economou
and the likelihood of subsequent expansion of that rule creates a
remedy of colossal unmanageability. Frivolous lawsuits are encouraged by a rule which draws no clear lines regarding which suits
should be permitted, or against whom they may be brought. Indeed, it is unmistakably clear that such lines elude definition.
The reasoning of Neely is directly applicable to every suit
seeking vindication for a constitutional tort brought against a personnel manager under the Federal Constitution. Even though the
Neely decision was handed down just seven days after Economou
and did not consider it, the reasoning and result remain valid. The
court's reliance on the fact that "[s]ince Bivens, the Supreme
Court has neither extended nor amplified on its original position
regarding the availability of tort remedies to redress invasions of
constitutional rights"' 7 should not be interpreted as a caveat. In
view of the preceeding discussion, the conclusions reached in Neely
363. H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 125 CONG. REC. H 1101 (1979); S. 695, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 125 CONG. REC. 2919-23 (1979). See generally Comment, Constitutional
Tort Remedies: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 CONN. L. REV.
492, 530-37 (1980). See also Dolan, Constituional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act,

14 U. RiCH. L. REv. 281, 298-309 (1980).
364.
365.

67 A.B.A.J. 160 (1981).
458 F. Supp. 945, 957 (D.D.C. 1978) (recognizing the weighty administrative sanc-

tions which may be taken against federal employees for improper conduct).
366. 403 U.S. at 407. See also Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(considering these factors in implying a remedy).
367. 458 F. Supp. at 957-58.
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represent what may and should become the controlling principle
denying relief to federal employees. Rather than leaving this important issue to the courts to resolve after protracted litigation and
confusion among the circuits and in government, Congress should
amend the Federal Tort Claims Act to waive sovereign immunity
for most common-law torts and all acts which violate constitutional rights of United States citizens, thereby making suits
brought against the United States the sole and exclusive remedy
for such conduct. Only by such action will the personnel manager
in the federal sector be assured that he or she can administer and
supervise free from the threat of individual liability for adverse action taken against employees. Any other rule will diminish efficiency, productivity and discipline in the federal work force.

